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Abstract: As it evolves around the world, Social Security financed on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis increasingly becomes a Ponzi scheme due to aging populations.  The main objective of 
Social Security is to insure seniors against an uncertain life span.  However, as the probability of 
being a net loser rises for coming generations, this objective receives questions with increasing 
public confusion: how does Social Security affect lifetime wealth? How could one calculate 
financial terms of Social Security for households in different generations? This paper is the first 
attempt in the literature to calculate the aggregate social security wealth (SSW) series for an 
emerging country, Turkey ― that has the most generous social security system in the OECD 
region.  Our simulations cover the period between 1970 and 2003 and the results show that the 
anticipated SSW is the biggest part of household wealth in Turkey and therefore it should not be 
ignored in economic studies.  In addition to the aggregate SSW series, we also analyze the 
generational fairness of the system by calculating its implicit rate of return for representative 
individuals in different age cohorts.  Our principal finding is that Social Security in Turkey 
constitutes significant wealth transfers among different age cohorts. 
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1. Introduction 
Social Security is the biggest portion of public budgets and affects millions of lives in 
many countries.  Since its introduction, there has been a growing debate on its financial 
sustainability and effects on economic values.  As it matures around the world, Social Security 
financed on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis increasingly becomes a Ponzi scheme due to aging 
populations.  The success of parametric reforms more and more depends on the willingness of 
every future generation to accept decreasing lifetime wealth.  The main objective of Social 
Security is to insure seniors against an uncertain life span. The first generations of the system 
were net gainers.  However, as the probability of being a net loser rises for coming generations, 
this objective receives questions with increasing public confusion: how does Social Security 
affect lifetime wealth? How could one calculate financial terms of Social Security for households 
in different generations? 
After two major economic crises in 1999 and 2001, Turkey has been undergoing the most 
severe recovery in its history helped by IMF and the World Bank. Following several major 
reforms in its fiscal policies, Turkey has become the biggest borrower (with more than $25 
billion in the last 6 years) in the history of international financial aids.  What are the generational 
characteristics of these major reforms in Social Security and Health Care?  Are these reforms 
able to provide a sustainable long-term recovery or do they only postpone the ―disaster‖ to future 
generations? These are unanswered questions so far.  The majority of proposed solutions are 
based on parametric adjustments in the system, perhaps because of their political feasibility.  
However, there is no single study to investigate the redistributive characteristics of major public 
programs and the aggregate magnitude of expected financial wealth generated by the Turkish 
Social Security relative to other forms of household wealth.  Studies that quantify the expected 
value of Social Security for different age cohort are limited.  Has this expectation been declining 
for younger age cohorts in Turkey?   
 Following the Feldstein‘s seminal paper in 1974, the questions above have been 
addressed by many researchers for mostly developed countries by calculating the net present 
value of expected social security benefits and contributions for households.  One common 
finding of these studies is that social security wealth is an important part of lifetime resources for 
households and its intergenerational distribution can affect economic dynamics.  This paper is 
the first attempt within this literature to calculate the aggregate social security wealth (SSW) 
series for an emerging country, Turkey ― that has the most generous social security system in 
the OECD region.  One reason for this scarcity of studies might be the limited availability of data 
for developing countries.1  Even though Turkey is not immune to this sort of problem, it has 
relatively better data sources and a long history with a public social security system.  Our 
simulations results that cover the period between 1970 and 2003 show that anticipated social 
security wealth is the biggest part of household wealth and therefore it should not be ignored in 
economic studies.  In addition to the aggregate social security wealth series, we also analyze the 
redistributive characteristics of the system by calculating the expected implicit rate of return and 
the net gains and losses perceived by a new participant to the system in different age cohorts.  
Our principal finding is that Social Security in Turkey constitutes significant wealth transfers 
between different age cohorts. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief literature review on the 
subject. The information about the Turkish social security system is provided in Section 3. 
                                                 
1
 Argentina is one of the few exceptions.  To our knowledge, it is the only emerging country that has generational 
accounting calculations whose results are presented by Altamiranda (1999).  
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Section 4 talks about the methods, assumptions, and data sources for our aggregate SSW series. 
The generational fairness of the system is discussed in Section 5. Our brief interpretation of the 
results is presented in Section 6.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Parametric reforms have been successful in postponing financial problems of PAYG 
systems at the cost of decreasing wealth for coming generations.  With the current trends in 
demographics, parametric reforms have turned intergenerational wealth distributions into 
unsustainable Ponzi schemes. While the generational fairness of Social Security has been 
questioned by public, it has also produced a strong interest among researchers because of its 
potential effects on economic dynamics such as saving and consumption.  The legacy debt 
cumulated by these parametric reforms has increased consumption for current generations and 
unpaid liabilities for unborn generations.  
The effect of declining expectations in social security wealth on saving has become a 
major question. There are two major arguments in the literature that make the answer 
theoretically ambiguous: (1) if mandatory social security transfers between generations are offset 
by altruistic voluntary transfers, national saving may not be affected by social security transfers 
dictated by a PAYG system (Barro 1974, 1978, and 1989). (2) In a simple life-cycle model 
setting, social security contributions crowds-out personal retirement saving.  However, this 
crowding-out is not necessarily hundred percent. Depending on the relative magnitudes of 
substitution and income effects, the introduction of PAYG system might even increase personal 
saving (Feldstein 1974).  Therefore, understanding how a social security system can affect 
saving needs information on two grounds: (1) the significance of intergenerational wealth 
reallocations and (2) the magnitude of the crowding-out in personal saving by public pension 
wealth mandated by a PAYG system. 
Empirical studies in evaluating the scale of these two measures have to quantify effects of 
Social Security on lifetime wealth.  The importance of intergenerational wealth distributions on 
economic dynamics is formally conceptualized by the Generational Accounting approach 
(Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 1991).  Unlike conventional public budgets, intertemporal 
government budgets calculate the present value of taxes and transfers that different age cohorts 
are expected to pay and receive over their remaining lives.  In this sense, generational accounts 
include and hence explicitly calculate gains and losses resulted from Social Security for different 
age cohorts.  The outcome of intertemporal budget calculations for twenty two countries 
including Argentina is published in a recent book (Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Leibfritz 1999).   
In addition to generational accounting calculations, several studies have attempted to 
quantify the significance of wealth redistributions among generations specifically caused by 
Social Security.  Even though each of these studies represents a different methodology, in 
general they calculate the expected net present value of contributions and benefits based on 
survival probabilities for a representative individual in different age cohorts. There are two 
common ways to calculate social security wealth series: (1) at any given time, SSW series can 
be calculated for the rest of the lives of all different age cohorts and therefore only future taxes 
can be taken into the calculation and past taxes could be considered as ―sunk‖; (2) unlike the 
first method where SSW increases for older cohorts, it could also be calculated at any given time 
as a difference between the present value of incurred and expected lifetime contributions and 
benefits.  While the first method is acceptable for aggregate SSW series for an economy, the 
second method is more appropriate for the purpose of finding lifetime wealth increments and 
losses of different age cohorts, genders, and income groups.  The implicit internal rate of return 
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(IRR) is a result of the second method and equates the present value of lifetime contributions to 
benefits that people in different circumstances anticipate.  Since these simulations need a set of 
reliable data sources covering a relatively longer period of time, they have been done mostly for 
developed countries. One common finding of these studies is that the early cohorts received very 
high rates of return on their contributions, while later cohorts are likely to have sharply 
decreasing rates of return well below the rate of return available on private assets. Studies by 
Meyer and Wolff (1987) and Boskin et al. (1985) give comprehensive literature reviews on 
simulations of internal rate of return and wealth redistributions. Two books, Eugene (1994) and 
Feldstein and Liebman (2002), give more updated surveys on the same subject.     
For the second question on whether or not pension wealth displaces personal saving, the 
studies need to quantify a social security variable in their regression analyses.  Empirical studies 
on the subject are based on three different types of data set and therefore might be classified 
accordingly: time-series, cross-sectional, and cross-country analyses.2  The heart of these 
analyses is the calculation of the social security wealth variable.  SSW, as a proxy for the future 
expected social security benefits and contributions, was conceptualized and calculated for the 
first time by Feldstein in his time-series study (1974). Because its complex simulation methods 
and many embedded assumptions, several researchers evaluate the results critically.  The major 
criticism comes from Leimer and Lesnoy (1982).  They argue that the expectation formation in 
the perception of benefit (and tax) factors is highly speculative3  and generate ten different 
methods for determining the expected benefit and tax ratios.  In addition the these adjustments in 
the Feldstein simulations, they also generate their new4 calculations of social security wealth, and 
show that both algorithms fail to have a significant effect of social security on saving.  
In his reply to these criticisms, Feldstein (1982) argues that SSW is only a proxy for 
people‘s perception of future social security wealth and it is not a precise variable but an 
approximation.  Therefore an exact actuarial calculation may be further away from the 
appropriate variable than a less inclusive approximation. Any modification in that proxy would 
not necessarily conform to people‘s expectations. 
Because of its complexity and sensitive assumptions, it has been also argued that 
empirical studies using aggregated or individual SSW series, which are not observable and have 
to be approximated, are of little importance.  However, the same argument could be used against 
other approximations in many time-series and cross-section studies: human capital, discounted 
future labor income, and so on.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Time-series analyses calculate the aggregate SSW series for the entire economy and then use it to see whether or 
not the aggregate consumption (or saving) over time is higher as the SSW gets higher.   Unlike time-series analyses, 
cross section analyses estimate asset equations rather than consumption functions with individually calculated social 
security wealth proxies. Therefore, the majority investigates the substitution between pension and non-pension 
wealth and look at the behavior of a group of households prior to retirement. There are many important studies on 
time-series as well as cross-section analyses. See Esposito (1978), Magnussen (1994), CBO (1998), and Engen and 
Gale (1997) for the complete list. 
3
 The ratio of first annuity to the last income is the benefit factor. The ratio of contributions to the current income is 
the tax factor. 
4
 They improve Feldstein‘s SSW series in several points: First, they expand the time from 1972 to 1974; second, 
they use variable adjustment factors for labor force participation rates in each year.  Besides, they use five different 
mortality tables for different periods.  In addition to these improvements they also recalculate the dependent wife 
and surviving widow benefits by using more refined data.  
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3. Turkish Social Security System 
The old-age security in Turkey, initiated after the Second World War, consists of three 
state-managed pension schemes5 that pay an earning-related defined benefit financed on pay-as-
you-go basis. In addition to its labor market distortions and redistribution to higher income 
groups, it is also financially insolvent. The lack of a minimum retirement age, which was 
removed in 1992, has been the major factor for the financial imbalance—Turkey had retirement 
ages as young as 47 years of age in SSK and 48 years of age in ES, the lowest in the world.6  
Moreover, Turkey is the only country in the world that simultaneously had very low minimum 
contribution periods (in some cases as low as 10 years) and high replacement rates (90% in 
SSK, 127% in Bag-Kur, and 106% in ES)7 with a lack of minimum retirement age before the 
1999 reform (The World Bank Country Economic Memorandum, 2000).  
The weak link8 between contributions and benefits before 1999 created an incentive for 
workers to declare the earnings base for premium at a lower value.   The high informal 
employment due to relatively high statutory contribution rates, the lack of automatic indexation 
of the contribution ceiling9 under high inflation conditions, and the low premium collection rates 
because of administrative inefficiencies worsened the already financially imbalanced system. As 
a result, the system became a major fiscal burden, damaging Turkey‘s macroeconomic stability. 
Coupled with other structural problems in the economy, the severe financial crisis early in 1999 
forced Turkish government led by the World Bank to reform the impaired social security system 
in August 1999. This ―parametric‖ reform was intended to achieve the actuarial balance of the 
PAYG system in the mid-term and to reduce pressure on the borrowing needs of the 
government. 
 
Table 1: Pension and Income for Selected Countries in OECD (2002, in US dollars) 
 
     Gross Relative Relative 
  Per Capita Average Replacement Pension Pension Pension 
  GNI Wage Rate Wealth Wealth Level 
 Hungary   5,100 4,187 75.4 55,000 11.7 72.2 
 Slovak Republic   4,080 3,031 48.6 27,000 7.9 47.9 
 Czech Republic   5,880 6,306 44.4 47,000 6.9 41.7 
 Mexico    5,950 6,180 36.0 28,000 4.5 35.7 
 Poland    4,680 6,456 56.9 51,000 7.7 55.5 
 Turkey    2,510 6,571 87.2 74,000 10.3 81.3 
 United Kingdom   25,560 29,133 37.1 172,000 5.5 37.1 
 United States   35,430 32,360 38.6 183,000 5.2 36.5 
 Canada   22,610 24,756 42.5 163,000 6.1 39.9 
 OECD Average     56.9 202,367 8.7 55.4 
 
                                                 
5
 Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu - SSK) for wage earners in private and public sectors, Bag-
Kur  (BK) for self-employed individuals and farmers, and Retirement Fund (Emekli Sandigi - ES) for civil servants 
6
 The average minimum retirement ages for OECD countries are 64.4 for men and 63.9 for women in 
2002 (OECD 2005). 
7
 These rates reflects 2004 values and taken from ―Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System‖ (2004). 
8
In SSK, pensions were linked to wages paid in the last five years and the same link was even worse in ES and Bag-
Kur: only the last year‘s wages were used to calculate pensions.  
9
 The ceiling on wages subject to social security contribution in the fall of 1995 actually fell below the minimum 
wage. The World Bank Report (2000, 2003) 
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The most fundamental characteristics of the Turkish social security system have been its 
generosity (relative to income) due to very young average retirement ages (in some cases 38 for 
women and 47 for men10), low minimum contribution periods, and high replacement rates.  
According to a new research by the OECD (2005), as seen in Table 1 above, a new entrant in 
Turkey has $74,000 average gross pension wealth with $2,510 per capita gross national income, 
while the same numbers are $183,000 and $35,430 for the US in 2002. In addition, Turkey‘s 
gross replacement rate (87.2%) is the highest in the OECD region, which has 56.7% of the same 
rate as an average.11 While this generosity has paved the way for the collapse of the system‘s 
actuarial and financial soundness and still presents a big problem for the system‘s sustainability, 
one would expect that this generosity would also have strong effects on consumption and saving 
behaviors of individuals.  It is this generosity that makes the Turkish case special relative to 
other developing countries in the literature. 
 
4. Aggregate Social Security Wealth Series for Turkey: Methods, Assumptions and Data 
Sources 
In calculating aggregate SSW series, we use simulations to convert assumptions about 
household‘s wages, survival rates, economy-wide growth rates of wages and annuities, interest 
rates, demographic projections, and possible future regulatory changes into expected present 
values of Social Security benefits and contributions for different genders, age groups, workers, 
retirees, and households with different marital status for the period between 1970 and 2003.  The 
fundamental procedure in calculating SSW for a typical individual has the following two steps: 
   
Present Value of Future Benefits (SSWG): 
 If an individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to the retirement age (ra), and if his 
current wage (or income that the old-age security is based on), W(a,t), grows at a constant 
rate of growth, g, then he will have an income at the retirement age of ra: 
 
  Wt+ra-a = Wt(1+g)
(ra-a)
        (1) 
 
 In order to calculate the first annuity for this individual, we use a benefit factor, (bf), 
which is basically the ratio of his first annuity to his last wage (or to his insurable income 
if he is among self-employed individuals). 
 Given the benefit factor, the individual will be entitled to his first annuity at ra, which is  
 
B(a,t)=bftWt(1+g)
(ra-a)
        (2) 
 
 If we further assume that real annuities will grow after ra by ga until the age of death 
(da), given the survival probabilities (S(i,j)) for that particular individual, the actuarial 
present value of future annuities (PVA) can be calculated at ra, where S(i,j) presents the 
probability of living at least to the age of j, given that the person lived to the age i. 
With the personal discount rate (d) for future real incomes, Equation (2) becomes at the 
age of ra: 
 
                                                 
10
 See ―Turk Emeklilik Sisteminde Reform‖ (The Reform in Turkish Pension System) TUSIAD November 2004 
P.108 
11
 Excluding Luxemburg which is an outlier with 101.9% gross replacement rate. 
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 At time (t), after substituting B(a,t) (Equation 2) into Equation 3, the person has the 
following expected present value of benefits at the age of a: 
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This also includes survival probabilities between the age of retirement (ra) and the 
current age (a) at time (t). 
 
Present Value of Future Contributions (SSTX): 
If the same individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to age ra, and if his current wage 
(or income that the old-age security is based on), W(a,t), grows at a constant rate of growth, g, 
then the expected present value of all his future contributions until age ra can be calculated 
as follows:  
 
am
t
ra
am
amtmata dgWSSSTX )1/()1(,, ,     (5) 
 
where θ is the ratio of social security taxes to his wages through his working years, and the 
person expects that at the age m he will pay a tax of  Tt+m-a=θt+m-aWt(1+g)
m-a
.  As noticed in 
Equation (5), SSTX treats contributions paid in the past as ―sunk‖.  This could be easily 
adjusted by adding the present value of all paid contributions to the equation.   
 
Equations (4) and (5) are the fundamental equations in calculating the expected SSW, 
which is the difference between SSWG and SSTX.  By construction, SSWG and SSTX equations 
above represent the present value of future benefits and contributions.  However, for any 
individual or a representative household of a group, the same values can be found by taking the 
past contributions and benefits into the calculation.  With necessary information about the 
parameters of the equations for a particular individual, SSWG and SSTX can be calculated 
explicitly for that individual (or household).  Many cross-section studies on the subject have 
been calculating SSW values for individuals or households by using similar functions.  Time-
series studies, on the other hand, use aggregated SSW series for economy-wise investigations.  
Before getting into the details of this aggregation method for the Turkish social security system, 
we should underline several common points that almost all simulations share in finding 
aggregate SSW series: 
 
1. The calculations are mostly done in a partial-equilibrium setting in the sense that the 
effects of Social Security on economy-wise expected discount rates, wages, and growth 
rates during the lifespan of an individual or for the period covered in an economy are not 
followed. 
2. Social Security benefits are usually limited to the retirement part of the programs.  
Benefits excludes other attached benefits (health care, etc.) provided by the system. 
3. Studies assume that the entire tax burden shifts onto workers. 
4. Calculations are not expected to be as precise as the exact actuarial values of SSW.  They 
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are only supposed to reflect magnitudes of individual or economy-wise perceived values 
that the presence of Social Security would offer.  If the fundamental functions are 
consistent with the system, SSW simulations can provide important information about 
individual and aggregate differences among households and years to carry out an 
empirical research.  
5. Since SSW is an expected value, a person does not have to be employed or a member of 
the system to have an expectation about the future social security entitlements.  Besides, 
in a typical household, children and wives/husbands can have these expectations based on 
their legal ties to a person covered by Social Security, even if they are underage or not 
working as to be covered directly by the system. 
6. Individuals form their expectations on the values of benefit and tax factors as well as 
discount and growth rates.  Therefore, how these expectations can be formed is the most 
important assumption in simulations.    
 
The aggregation of individual SSW values for different generations, age cohorts, and for 
the entire economy for any given period reveals generational fairness of the system and the share 
of SSW in total household wealth. The same fundamental equations are used for the aggregate 
SSW series with one major adjustment: because it is practically imposable to find individually 
recognized wages, per capita personal disposable income is used as ―reference‖ income.     
 
Aggregated SSW Series for Turkey:  There are four major steps in constructing the 
aggregate SSW series for Turkey: The first step is to identify the ―benefit and tax factors‖ with 
different assumptions in expectation formation. The second step is to create the demographics 
(including survival rates) of the labor market and current beneficiaries.  The third step is to 
decide on the ―reference income‖ for aggregation.  The last step is to put all steps together in a 
software program to simulate a set of SSW series with different sets of assumptions.  We 
calculated the SSW series for 34 years from 1970 to 2003 at 1987 prices.  We chose this period 
because the data about the demographics of labor market were not readily available for earlier 
years. 
1. Benefit and Tax Factors: The key components of the SSW simulations are the benefit 
and tax factors.  The benefit factor is defined as the ratio of per retiree annual benefits to per 
capita reference income.  Likewise, the tax factor is the ratio of social security taxes 
(contributions) per covered worker to per capita reference income. These ratios are not constant 
over the years and therefore how individuals perceive them for their future entitlements and 
liabilities becomes a critical assumption.  Before discussing this assumption further, let us first 
explain how these factors are calculated for Turkey.   
Benefit Factors (Ratios): The three public social security institutions, Social Security 
Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu -- SSK) for wage earners, Bag-Kur (BK) for self-
employed people, and Pension Fund (Emekli Sandigi -- ES) for civil servants, provide a range of 
coverage.  We use only old-age, disability and survivor (death) insurance (ODS) in our SSW 
simulations.  First, we find the numerator of the ratio, per retiree (excluding survivors and 
disability retirees) annual old-age benefits, for each institution and each year.  Even though we 
have a gender-based distribution of the numbers of retirees for each institution, some difficulties 
arise in obtaining the paid ODS benefits in terms of gender.  Therefore, we make an educated 
assumption here to obtain the factor for males and females separately.  We assume that per 
retiree old-age benefits for females are 30% less than the benefits for male retirees and calculate 
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them as follows:
12
 
 
  Mn + Fn = Tn 
  Mb + Fb = Tb 
 
After dividing the second expression by Tn and rearranging it, we get 
 
Tn
Tb
Tn
Fn
x
Fn
Fb
Tn
Mn
x
Mn
Mb
 . 
 
Since we assume that 
Fn
Fb
x
Mn
Mb
7.0     , 
per retiree benefits are calculated for both genders as follows  
 
TnxFnTnMn
TnTb
Mn
Mb
/7.0/
/
 and  
TnFnTnxMn
TnTb
Fn
Fb
//7.0/1
/
 . 
 
In the absence of personal disposable income series, we use per capita net private 
disposable income (NprvDI) for the denominator of the same ratio (benefit factor). NprvDI is 
also used as ―reference income‖ in the entire simulation.  Its derivation will be discussed in the 
third step and the table for each year‘s benefit factor is given at the end. As seen Figure 1 below, 
benefit factors over the years show a strong negative trend with very high t-values. Therefore, 
taking the benefit factor constant over the years is open to discussion. 
 
Figure 1: Benefit Factors 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12M, F, and T represent male, female, and total respectively. Subscripts n and b indicate ‗numbers‘ and ‗benefits‘ so 
that Mn and Mb, for instance, represent the total number of male retirees and the total benefits paid to male retirees 
respectively. 
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Tax Factors:  In order to find the tax factor, which is the ratio of social security taxes 
(contributions) per covered worker to per capita ―reference income‖, we first find the number of 
covered workers for each year, from 1970 to 2003, for each of the three social security 
institutions. As in the calculation of the benefit factor, we have the same difficulties in obtaining 
the incurred social security premiums in terms of gender. Therefore, we apply the same 
assumption here and reduce ODS contributions for females 30%.   
 In calculating the incurred social security taxes, we find the premiums only for the ODS 
coverage.  Since the total employer share is shifted onto workers through lower wages, the 
premiums are the sum of the employees‘ and employers‘ shares. Our findings about the tax ratios 
are given at the end.  Even though it is not as strong as in benefits factors, tax factors also exhibit 
trends as seen below. 
 
 Figure 2: Tax Factors 
 
 
As stressed before, the assumption about how people perceive both benefit and tax 
factors is very critical in terms of finding SSW series that represent people‘s expectation. 
Because of strong trends in both factors, we think that SSW values simulated by average factors 
are not appropriate in representing people‘s expectations.  However, in order to test the 
sensitivity of the SSW series to different assumption on expectations, we use three perception 
methods as explained below.13  
 
Method 1:  Individuals base their anticipated benefit and tax ratios on some average over the 
period of analysis14.  Therefore the factors can be taken as constant as follows: 
t
t bb
ˆ
ˆ
 
b denotes the benefit factor and  denotes the tax factor and the values for three institutions are 
given below. 
 
                                                 
13
 We suggest that these methods should be extended and changed depending on the nature of investigation. 
14
 The factor with a bar represents the average, and with a hat, expectation of the factor. 
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  SSK   ES   BK   Total   
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
Benefit Factors   0.93       0.65   1.76       1.23   0.71       0.50   1.24       0.87   1.17  
Tax Factors  0.29       0.20   0.58       0.41   0.06       0.04   0.30       0.21   0.28  
 
Method 2:  Individuals expect the future benefit and tax factors to equal their current benefit and 
tax factors. That is: 
 
tt
tt bb
ˆ
ˆ
     
 
Method 3:  Individuals are able to consider both past and current values of the benefit and tax 
factors.  They form their expectation by an adaptive expectation process.  
 
ttt
ttt bbb
)1(ˆˆ
)1(ˆˆ
1
1
 
 
In this method, we apply a 3-year moving average with the weights (β, δ) of 50% for the current 
year and 25% for the last two years each.  These weights are chosen arbitrarily. The list of values 
for the last two methods is given in appendices. 
2. Demographics and Survival Rates:  Because of the limited availability of the necessary 
data, the most difficult part of constructing the SSW series for Turkey is the part that deals with 
the demographics of the labor force and the current beneficiaries.  We used several different 
sources for our data collection and had to estimate some years.  There are six main groups in 
calculating the SSW series: workers, workers‘ wives, old-age retirees, old-age retirees‘ wives, 
disability retirees, and survivors  
Workers:  Since the ultimate task is to construct expected social security wealth, the 
ultimate number of people who may perceive this wealth at working-age, is not simply the 
number of individuals who actively contribute to one of the public social security plans in any 
given year, rather the number of all individuals who can expect to receive SSW from a public 
social security system in the future.15 In other words, even if a person at working-age is not 
currently in the labor force, she may expect to have some future retirement benefits conditional 
on future employment opportunities.16  Therefore, SSW simulations should contain current and 
prospective workers together.   
In aggregation of SSW series, the major question becomes how many people at any given 
age could expect to have old-age benefits regardless of whether or not they are in the labor force. 
We estimate the ultimate number of persons for each age group who would eventually be entitled 
to a social security benefit by the number of current workers adjusted for labor force 
participation.  We use the maximum labor force participation rate (MaxLFPR) in each year for 
                                                 
15
 This is the main difference between the calculation of SSW series in the literature and the ―Pension Wealth‖ 
calculated by OECD for 2002 (Pension at a Glance 2005, OECD). 
16
 For example, a student in the age group of 15-19 can expect to have retirement benefits at 55, even if she is not 
currently in the labor force. Likewise, an older person, who is at the age of 57 and not currently in the labor force, 
might have been employed before and therefore she may expect to have retirement benefits even she is not currently 
in the labor force.   
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each age group to find the number of individuals who may have expected SSW.  In other words, 
we applied the following method for every age group and year: 
 
Total Number of Individuals with SSW  = Civilian Population (year, age, gender)  X  MaxLFPR 
(year, gender)  X  Employment Rate (year, age, gender) 
 
We constructed the demographics of the Turkish labor force market from 1970 to 2003.  We 
have the following table (Table 2) for every year in that period.  
 
Table 2: An Example from the Labor Demographics 
  Age Groups         (Thousands) 
1970  15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Total 
Male Population 1,849 1,467 1,148 978 1,097 903 692 473 588 454 724 10,371 
 Labor Force 1,210 1,244 1,045 903 1,025 845 628 428 504 367 498 8,697 
 Employment 1,134 1,166 979 846 961 792 589 401 472 344 467 8,152 
 LFPR 65% 85% 91% 92% 93% 94% 91% 90% 86% 81% 69% 84% 
 Highest LFPR 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%  
 P 70% 91% 97% 99% 100% 100% 97% 97% 92% 86% 74%  
 W/P  1,621   1,286   1,007   857   962   792   607   415   515   398    635   9,095  
Female Population 1,876 1,308 1,062 1,034 1,044 841 668 476 545 439 802 10,096 
 Labor Force 1,036 705 548 536 538 455 360 258 271 212 288 5,209 
 Employment 971 661 514 503 504 426 338 242 254 199 270 4,882 
 LFPR 55% 54% 52% 52% 52% 54% 54% 54% 50% 48% 36% 52% 
 Highest LFPR 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%  
 P 100% 98% 94% 94% 93% 98% 98% 98% 90% 88% 65%  
 W/P   971    677   550   535   540   435   346   246   282   227    415   5,225  
 
 The derivation of W/P in Table 2 is given below: 
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where W is the number of employed people, LF is Labor Force and POP is Population. 
Subscripts, a and y, denote age groups and years respectively.  Consistent with the methodology 
described above, the last expression is the number of people that would be employed if the 
maximum (prime age) labor force participation rate (MaxLFPR) were applied for this age group.  
This could be interpreted as the number of people in this age group who would expect to receive 
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benefits when they retire.17  
Because the State Institute of Statistics‘ (SIS) Labor Force Database starts from 1988, we 
could use them only for the years between 1988 and 2003 to build the tables. Before 1988, we 
utilized Bulutay‘s (1995) study for finding the numbers of employment, labor force and civilian 
population.  Because Bulutay‘s (1995) study is not based on gender and age, we, therefore, 
referred to the International Labor Organization‘s (ILO) database for 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 
in order to estimate gender and age distributions for these measures. 
Unfortunately this is not the end of the story for finding the number of individuals who 
may have a perception of social security wealth.  The ratio of number of individuals who are 
actively contributing to a public social security program to the total employment is very low in 
Turkey.18  Even though this ratio has been improving since 1970, as shown in the following 
Table 3, more than 40% of the employed population is not contributing to the public pension 
system even in the year 2003. 
 
Table 3: Covered Employment Based on Gender19 
        Covered Employment 
  Total Active       Ratio  
 Employment Insured SSK BK ES PF Male Female Total 
1970    13,033,977         2,172,330      1,313,500      823,829                  1    35,000  22% 8% 17% 
1975    14,386,813         3,779,893      1,823,338   1,092,000       816,555    48,000  35% 10% 26% 
1980    15,702,127         4,708,044      2,204,807   1,325,000    1,100,500    77,737  39% 12% 30% 
1985    16,699,204         5,890,253      2,626,165   1,400,000    1,787,310    76,778  46% 15% 35% 
1990    18,539,000         7,990,454      3,520,909   1,560,000    2,825,473    84,072  53% 21% 43% 
1991    19,289,000         8,201,767      3,692,071   1,600,000    2,825,542    84,154  52% 20% 43% 
1992    19,459,000         8,727,634      3,911,876   1,851,000    2,890,471    74,287  54% 22% 45% 
1993    18,501,000         8,993,561      4,153,347   1,896,041    2,870,968    73,205  56% 28% 49% 
1994    20,006,000         9,083,046      4,415,611   1,896,000    2,700,398    71,037  54% 23% 45% 
1995    20,585,000         9,284,849      4,664,207   1,880,437    2,669,351    70,854  54% 22% 45% 
1996    21,194,000         9,554,743      4,868,562   1,963,751    2,650,965    71,465  54% 24% 45% 
1997    21,201,000       10,187,024      5,313,146   1,994,509    2,804,890    74,479  56% 27% 48% 
1998    21,778,000       10,845,817      5,786,925   2,072,867    2,908,499    77,526  59% 27% 50% 
1999    22,048,000       10,460,794      5,199,229   2,118,085    3,064,619    78,861  53% 33% 47% 
2000    21,581,000       10,994,287      5,439,400   2,163,698    3,312,694    78,495  56% 38% 51% 
2001    21,525,000       10,674,982      5,029,187   2,236,050    3,336,655    73,090  55% 36% 50% 
2002    21,351,000       11,137,196      5,371,446   2,372,777    3,321,332    71,641  59% 36% 52% 
2003    21,148,000       11,663,428      5,800,506   2,408,148    3,383,849    70,925  61% 41% 55% 
 
Sources: The data is collected from SIS and Devlet Planlama Teskilati (State Planning Organization - SPO). 
 
If we discount the number of individuals (W/P) by these ratios, we implicitly assume that 
people who do not contribute to one of the social security programs any given year expect that 
                                                 
17
 The adjustment factor, P, is constant in Feldstein‘s (1974) calculation for the entire period.  We calculate it for 
each year.   
18
 The number of active insured persons also includes voluntary active insured individuals, farmers who are 
contributing to the public social security system and workers who are covered by private funds.  
19
 Social Security Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu -- SSK) for wage earners, Bag-Kur (BK) for self-employed 
people, and the Pension Fund (Emekli Sandigi -- ES) for civil servants and private funds (PF) for people who work 
in a company with private retirement fund.   
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they will never contribute to the system later.  However, as seen in Figure 2 above, the total ratio 
for covered workers has improved from 17 % to 55% in 33 years and is expected to continue 
improving in the future with the help of several administrative reforms achieved after 1999.  That 
is, if we discount the numbers in 1970 by 83%, for example, we should assume that only 17% of 
the people in an age group (say 15-19) could expect to have a social security wealth in the future.  
However, in five years, the ratio improves 60% from 17% to 26%.  The question then becomes 
whether or not the additional 9% people covered in 1975 can foresee this improvement and 
expect some future social security wealth in 1970? 
In order to avoid a speculative assumption about people‘s perception of this 
improvement, we assume that people are not able to anticipate that the public social security 
coverage will improve for the coming years.  This assumption is also consistent with the second 
perception method, which, we believe, is the best method for Turkey.  Barro (1978) criticized 
Feldstein‘s SSW series, which uses the current coverage rates and the average benefit factor, by 
indicating that ―the treatment of coverage and benefit rates (factors) is also asymmetric in that 
anticipated future coverage is assumed to correspond to current coverage, (…), while 
anticipated benefit rates are invariant—hence SSW— with respect to changes in actual benefit 
rates‖ (p.15).  In order to include those uncovered employees, however, this assumption can be 
changed by forming a ―reasonable‖ expectation method for the perception of future 
improvements.  Our simulation program is adjustable in terms of this assumption. 
Workers’ Wives:  After having the final gender and age specific base numbers for 
potential workers for each year, we also estimated the number of dependents who may expect to 
have social security wealth in the future conditional on the potential workers‘ expected 
retirement benefits.  In other words, if a worker is married, his wife can have an expectation 
about future social security wealth conditional on her husband‘s future retirement benefits.  For 
this, we made the following assumptions:  
 Only wives have SSW expectations. We assume that workers‘ children, as dependents, 
don‘t have SSW expectations. 
 If the worker dies, the benefit passes to his dependents with a generalized discount rate 
for all three social security systems, which is 75%20. 
 Wives are 3 years younger than workers. 
 We used ―Single Ratio‖ (from SIS‘s related statistics) for workers to estimate the number 
of married male workers for each age group and discounted the number of wives by these 
ratios.  
Current Old-Age Retirees:  In order to find the number of beneficiaries who receive 
annuities from the public social security system, we used the data privately provided by SSK, 
BK and ES.  As explained before, the number of retirees includes all individuals who receive 
only old-age benefits from the public social security system.  We used gender base per retiree 
benefits and numbers to calculate SSW series for each public pension scheme.  Since we could 
not have detailed age distribution, we used average ages for each scheme and gender.  
                                                 
20
 There are several important rules in calculating survivor‘s annuities.  These rules are slightly different among the 
three programs.  The major rules are as follows:  a wife‘s employment status does not affect her eligibility for 
survival benefits.  A worker in SSK must pay 1800-day premium out of 7000 days in order for his dependents to be 
eligible for retirement benefits.  If the worker dies in a work accident, this rule does not apply and dependents 
receive full retirement benefits.  If wives do not have kids who are eligible to survivor‘s benefits, wives receive 75% 
of benefits, otherwise the ratio becomes 50% and the rest is distributed to eligible children and parents (of worker).  
For BK and ES, a 5-year and 10-year paid premium periods (respectively) are sufficient for a worker‘s dependents 
to have retirement benefits.  The other rules for ES and BK are similar to those for SSK. 
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Retirees’ Wives:  Similar to expectations of workers‘ wives, we estimate the number of 
wives who may expect to have some social security wealth, conditional on the retirees‘ expected 
retirement benefits.  We use the same assumptions as used in estimating workers‘ wives 
expectations.  
Disability Retirees:  We find the number of individuals who are retired under the 
disability coverage for each public pension scheme and use an average age for each gender and 
scheme.  We have detailed information about the number of retirees based on gender for SSK.  
However, we had to estimate this gender distribution for ES and partly for BK.  We assumed that 
80% of disability retirees are male for ES and it is 93% for BK.  Since the number of total 
disability retirees is about as low as 36,000 in 2003 for ES and BK, a possible mistake in the 
gender distribution is negligible in the overall SSW simulations. 
Survivors:  We have three types of survivors: wives, orphans and workers‘ spouses. We 
find the numbers of each who receives survival benefits from SSK, ES and BK.  We ignore the 
gender distribution since the majority of the survivors are female (wives, daughters and 
mothers).  We use average ages for wives, orphans and spouses for each scheme and each year.  
In addition, we make the following assumptions: 
 We assume that orphans could receive survivor benefits for ten years. 
 Since the number of spouses is very low, we consider spouses and wives as one group. 
 Because we do not have exact numbers of wives and orphans for ES separately, we 
assume that wives and veterans make up 55 % of the all survivors in ES and the rest is 
orphans  
Survival Probabilities:  Turkey does not have its own mortality rate tables.  Therefore, 
the private pension schemes in Turkey have been using the mortality rates calculated for the U.S.  
There are four types of mortality rates commonly used in Turkey:  CSO 1980, CSO 53-58, 
ADST 49-51, and Heubeck Fischer tables for disabled persons.21  These mortality tables are also 
allowed by the government agencies regulating the private pension market in Turkey.  We have 
chosen ADST 49-51 for the following reason: it is the oldest mortality table among the three and 
therefore the rates are higher than the others.  Even though we believe that the differences among 
these three tables would not have significant effects on the SSW series, by selecting the ―worst‖ 
mortality rates, a kind of adjustment in terms of mortality rates was made for the difference 
between Turkey and the U.S. 
 
Table 4: Portion of Survival Probabilities for Males in Turkey     
       Prob. Of 
   Person Alive   Survival 
 Female Male at the age of X Life Tables Death up to age X 
X qx qx FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE MALE 
0 0.04909 0.06177 10,000,000 10,000,000 490,900 617,700 1.00000 
1 0.00360 0.00416 9,509,100 9,382,300 34,233 39,030 0.93823 
2 0.00215 0.00246 9,474,867 9,343,270 20,371 22,984 0.93433 
3 0.00164 0.00194 9,454,496 9,320,285 15,505 18,081 0.93203 
4 0.00127 0.00153 9,438,991 9,302,204 11,988 14,232 0.93022 
5 0.00099 0.00121 9,427,003 9,287,971 9,333 11,238 0.92880 
6 0.00082 0.00102 9,417,671 9,276,733 7,722 9,462 0.92767 
7 0.00063 0.00094 9,409,948 9,267,271 5,928 8,711 0.92673 
                                                 
21
 We thank to Aviva Life Insurance for providing these mortality tables. 
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In order to show how the survival probabilities are calculated, a small part of the table for 
males is given in Figure 4 above.22  In this table, the ADST 49–50 columns show the mortality 
rates.  We start with 10 million individuals at age zero.  For each of the following age, we found 
the number of deaths and the probability of survival up to any given age.  We calculated the 
conditional probabilities in order to find the probability of survival up to a specific age given that 
the person lived up to a given age for each gender.  
3. Reference Income:  We need a ―reference income‖ to calculate SSW series in two 
places: (1) in the calculation of benefit and tax factors, explained in the first step; (2) in the 
calculation of the first annuities, which will be explained in the last step.  The SSW series are 
calculated in the literature by using personal disposable incomes (PDI).    Unfortunately, PDI 
series based on surveys do not exist for Turkey.   
 As mentioned in the first step, we use Net Private Disposable Income (NPrvDI) in 
constructing SSW series. We fist attempted to create a ―generated‖ PDI by using national 
account identities as follows: 
 
PDI ≈ NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT23 
 
However, because of the difficulties in finding reliable information in Turkey about the 
components of PDI above, we decided to use Net Private Disposable Income.  The difference 
between NprvDI and PDI is simply RE shown below by using a textbook version of national 
account identity: 
 
 GNP = C + I + G +NX + Net Factor Incomes from Abroad (NFI) 
GNP – TX + TR + NINT = C + I - (TX – G – TR - NINT) + (NX + NFI) 
 
After adding TX (taxes), TR (transfers), and NINT (net interest rates paid by government) both 
sides, the left hand side of the second identity above is Gross Private Disposable Income 
(GPrvDI) and the first and second parentheses in the right side are government saving (GS) and 
foreign sources (FS) respectively as expressed below: 
 
GPrvDI = C + I – GS + FS24 
 
Since GPrvDI = GNP – TX + TR + NINT, if the consumption of capital (CoC) subtracted from 
both sides, we get 
                                                 
22
 In the table, qx denotes the mortality rate for the age x. 
23
 Net National Product (NNP) = GNP – Depreciation 
Net Income (NI) = NNP – Indirect Taxes (InTX) + Subsidies 
PDI = NI – (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) + Net Interest (NINT) + (Transfers (TR)-Contribution to Social 
Security (SS)) – Personal Taxes (PrsTX) 
Since (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) = (Corporate Taxes (CorpTX)–Retained Earnings (RE)) 
PDI = NI – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX 
PDI = NNP – (IndTX + Subsidies) – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX 
If we group taxes then 
PDI = NNP- (IndTX + CorpTX + SSTX + PrsTX) + TR + NINT -RE 
Since the first parenthesis on the right hand side is simply TX  (Taxes) we can generate the following identity for 
national account: 
PDI ≈ NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT.  A similar method is used by Meguire (1998). 
24
 GprvDI is also calculated by SPO since 1975 in ―General Macro Balance of the Economy‖ using similar methods. 
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NPrvDI = NNP – TX + TR + NINT  
 
As seen from this identity, the difference between NprvDI and PDI is simply RE about which we 
do not have any information.  However, as long as individuals perceive undistributed profits as 
capital gains (hence a part of their income), the difference between NprvDI and PDI is expected 
to be insignificant.25  We used the following NprvDI definition as our reference income series in 
our calculations.  
 
NprvDI = C + I – GS + FS - CoC 
 
4. Putting All Pieces Together:  In order to have the SSW series, the SSWG and SSTX 
series should be constructed first. We summarize the calculations in Figure 4 and the major 
assumptions are given below. 
(1) The critical assumptions are the personal discount rate (d), and the real income 
growth rate (g). For the growth rate, we looked at the entire period and found approximately 
1.9% average growth for per capita GDP and NPrvDI.  Therefore, the growth rate for the real 
income is taken as 2% in our entire SSW series.  For the personal discount rate (d), we calculate 
the real interest rates for each year by consumer price inflation and time-deposit interest rates.26   
In our calculation, the average real interest rate is found to be about zero.  One reason for this 
near-zero real interest rate is that the nominal rates were not free before 1980 and, therefore, the 
real interest rates were mostly negative up to 1980.  After the financial liberalization during the 
early 1980s, the average real interest rate started to rise to 1.6% for the period between 1980 and 
2003.  W made it adjustable and initially took it to be 3% for our SSW calculations. 
 
Table 5: Average Ages27 
 SSK   ES   BK  
 M F  M F  M F 
Retirement age 55 55  55 55  55 55 
Maximum age 85 85  85 85  85 85 
Average Age for Retirees 59 59  60 55  65 63 
Average Age for Disability Retirees 60 57  60 55  61 63 
 W&S O  W&S O  W&S O 
Average Age for Survivors 62 29  65 34  62 29 
 
(2) The other key parameter is the average retirement age.  We used the related information from 
the three public social security programs and found that 55 could be taken as the average age for 
retirement for the entire public social security system.  Therefore, we used 55 for both genders 
and each year as the average retirement age in both the SSWG and SSTX calculations for 
working-age individuals.28 Because of the social security reform initiated in 1999, we use 58 
(female workers) and 60 (male workers) for 15-19 and 20-24 age groups respectively after 1999.  
                                                 
25
 See Ando and Modigliani (1963). 
26
 Real Interest Rate = (Nominal Interest Rate – Inflation)/(1 + Inflation). 
27
 M, male; F, female; W&S, wives and spouses; O, orphans.  In ES, W&S includes veterans. 
28
 After the reforms since 1999, the retirement age has been increased to 58 (female) and 60 (male) for new entrants.  
These ages were reduced to 56 and 58 respectively in 2002. These minimum ages are phased-in gradually for the 
previously insured employees. 
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We also take 85 as the maximum age in all calculations.29  The average ages that we use in our 
calculations are summarized in Table 5 above. 
 (3) As Figure 3 below shows, there are fluctuations around the average rate of 0.5% in 
the growth of per retiree annuities (ODS) in real terms.  Even though the same average for the 
last 24 years (1980-2003) is 2.4%, we calculated SSW series with and without 2%. In other 
words, we assumed that annuities grow only by the price inflation with the zero-percent real 
growth rate.30  
 
 Figure 3: Growth in Annuities (with 1987 Prices) 
 
(4) Since we were not able to obtain a gender base benefit and tax information, we 
assumed that the per capita old-age benefits and ODS taxes would be 30% less for females than 
for males.31  Therefore, instead of dealing with insufficient data and sensitive assumptions to 
calculate the ―precise‖ values, we used a generalized discount factor to reflect the gender 
difference in SSW calculations.32 We believe that a 30-percent discount for both factors is a 
reasonable and modest estimation for Turkey. This discount rate can be changed to test the 
sensitivity of the results to this discrimination.  
(5) Similarly, since we did not have details about the benefit distribution between orphans 
and wives, we reduced per beneficiary benefits 50% for orphans using the same method as in 
benefit and tax factors calculations. 
(6) P, the labor force adjustment factor is the same for all years in Feldstein‘s SSW 
calculations, which is criticized by Leimer and Lesnoy (1980).  We use the labor force 
adjustment factor, P, which varies each year. Unlike Feldstein‘s method (1974), we adjusted the 
number of workers by MaxLFPR in SSTX calculations. 
(7) Since we do not have the number of covered people based on gender up to 1993 for 
ES, we use the same percentage for the gender distributions between 1970 and 1992 as in 1993. 
(8) We use the total ―statutory revenues‖ as premiums received by ES.  Since ES 
provides only ODS coverage we believe that any possible difference would be negligible.   
                                                 
29
 Maximum life expectancies are projected 80 for males and 83 for females at age 65 for 2040 by OECD (2005). 
30
 However, if we remove the outlier growth (60%) in 1996, the average approaches to zero. 
31
 For example, the male benefit and tax factors are twice higher than the female factors in the U.S. (Feldstein –
1974). 
32
 For this assumption, we made use of SIS‘s Social Structure and Gender Statistics in Income Distribution Study 
(1994). 
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(9) Since BK started providing health coverage after 1985, we discounted total premiums 
collected 50% for ODS coverage. 
(10) In ES survivors group, we put wives, spouses and veterans together under the 
number of wives. 
(11) Individuals, once they are covered by the system, have full career paths without any 
interruptions.  In addition, as the time goes by, survival probabilities should change.  We ignore 
these changes in survival probabilities and used only one series of survival probabilities in 
simulations.  
 
Figure 4: Aggregate SSWG and SSTX Definitions                   
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M = Male, F = Female, G=Gender, t = year, a = age at time t, ra = retirement age, ara = average age for retirees, 
m = age between current age a and retirement age ra, n = age between retirement age ra and the maximum age, 
85, w= wives, O=orphans, d = personal discount rate, g = growth rate of real reference income, ga= growth rate of 
real annuities, W = number of employers, P = LFPR adjustment factor, C = ratio of active insured employment to 
total employment, Ө= tax factor, Y = reference income, AVB = per retiree average old-age benefit, ABD= per 
retiree average disability benefit, ABSW= per retiree (wives) average survivors benefit, ABSO= per retiree 
(orphans) average survivors benefit S(a,m) = survival probability of a person who lives up to age m, given that she/he 
lived up to age a, bf = benefit factor, N = number of old-age beneficiaries, sr = % of male married, BR = discount 
ratio for benefits passed from worker or retirees to survivors.
 21 
5. Results:  The first thing to observe is the magnitude of the SSW series relative to other 
forms of household wealth and NPrvDI as seen in Table 6 below.  This observation reinforces 
the argument that the social security wealth could be an important determinant in saving and 
consumption studies. 
 
Table 6: Total Wealth in Financial Assets, Housing and SSW33 with NPrvDI 
(Million TL in 1987 Prices) 
 TFA
34
 Housing
35
 SSWG SSW NPrvDI 
1970 7,588,518 32,700,333 54,350,527 43,721,351 25,592,525 
1975 10,806,548 41,781,557 89,508,490 69,086,105 33,269,315 
1980 9,674,345 56,696,805 63,905,043 33,945,697 42,029,239 
1985 20,075,898 63,750,469 62,728,296 24,296,819 45,873,753 
1990 26,996,582 88,709,913 111,574,201 65,316,832 67,179,895 
1995 46,704,601 128,391,319 103,123,054 49,536,263 84,157,732 
1996 61,819,289 135,536,058 171,916,203 119,046,643 86,040,622 
1997 69,998,934 152,101,623 231,487,100 160,536,942 92,590,536 
1998 75,985,989 160,030,906 277,262,042 185,039,302 102,044,735 
1999 96,063,696 159,652,714 292,422,907 198,503,687 102,748,644 
2000 95,036,365 159,160,494 276,903,910 185,179,981 103,808,861 
2001 146,103,010 165,728,972 270,810,987 198,497,777 100,472,296 
2002 126,833,322 158,074,788 297,929,986 236,761,695 98,286,544 
2003 117,491,297 166,061,466 342,736,721 283,310,716 105,211,662 
 
The second important point is that SSWG and SSW series overweigh NPrvDI most of the 
time.  There are two major reasons for this increasing trend in the SSW series: first, the 
participation rate to the public social security system for the workers exponentially increases 
over the years, and second, even though the increase in the number of covered workers is high, 
the number of beneficiaries in the system even grows faster than the active contributors.  After 
1992, the minimum retirement age requirement was removed. This elimination of minimum age 
requirement led to average age retirement ages as young as 47 years of age in SSK and 48 years 
of age in ES, the lowest in the world (The World Bank Country Economic Memorandum, 
2000).36 As seen Table 7 below, the number of beneficiaries increases 1944% whereas the 
number of individuals who contribute to the system increases only 437% between 1970 and 
2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 SSW series are calculated by 3% discount rate, 2% growth rate in income (not in annuities) with ―current benefit 
factor‖ method. 
34
 Total Financial Assets (TFA) is calculated by State Planning Organization (SPO) for the entire economy 
regardless of who holds them. 
35
 Housing wealth is an approximation, see Appendix. 
36
 Minimum ages were very low even before 1999.  The average minimum retirement ages for OECD countries are 
64.4 for men and 63.9 for women in 2002 (OECD 2005). 
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Table 7: Turkish Public Social Security Participants  
 Total Active % Total % Dependency 
 Contributors Growth ODD Beneficiaries Growth Ratio 
1970 2,172,330  331,399  6.56 
1975 3,779,893 74% 625,657 89% 6.04 
1980 4,708,044 117% 1,240,214 274% 3.80 
1985 5,890,253 171% 1,975,399 496% 2.98 
1990 7,990,454 268% 2,928,240 784% 2.73 
1995 9,284,849 327% 4,107,168 1139% 2.26 
2000 10,994,287 406% 5,842,170 1663% 1.88 
2001 10,674,982 391% 6,187,382 1767% 1.73 
2002 11,137,196 413% 6,476,932 1854% 1.72 
2003 11,663,428 437% 6,774,131 1944% 1.72 
 
We applied three different perception methods for benefit and tax factors.  As Figure 5 
below shows, because of the strong trends in both factors, the SSW series calculated with 
constant average benefit and tax factors substantially underestimate SSW before 1981 and 
overestimate it after 1981 relative to other perception methods. 
 
 Figure 5: Per Capita SSWG Series with Different Perceptions37   
 
 
As noted before, SSW is a proxy for the perception of future public social security 
entitlements.  Many improvements can be made to have more ―precise‖ SSW series. We did not 
take the health benefits into account for example. Likewise, in calculating SSWG for 
beneficiaries, we applied gender based average ages. Additional micro level data and information 
can be used to make the SSW series more precise.  However, how appropriate the improvements 
are depends on the extent to which they are perceived and anticipated by people. We are not 
looking for a simulation that provides exact actuarial values of social security wealth in Turkey.  
                                                 
37
 av, average factors, is the first perception method; ae, adaptive expectations, is the second; and cr, current is the 
third. 
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In principle, if the social security wealth series represent the perception of the people about the 
magnitude of the complex actuarial future benefits and tax liabilities in Social Security, this 
would be satisfactory for our purposes. Instead of making more fine-tunings in our SSW series, 
we look at our assumptions more critically. 
We consider the SSW series calculated with 3% discount rate, 2% growth rate and the 
―current‖ benefit and tax factors as our main SSW series.  The detailed tables and graphs for 
these SSW series are given at the end.    
 
5. Generational Fairness of the Turkish Social Security System 
In addition to its aging population,38 Turkey has an additional challenge: it has a very 
low labor force participation rate and widespread informal sectors.39 For the last seven years, 
there have been four parametric reforms in Turkey, all of which have been designed to phase-in 
gradually. In other words, only new generations face the full adjustment cost to achieve the 
long-run financial sustainability of the system. The Turkish social security system is and has 
been a Ponzi scheme for a long time: unpaid liabilities for coming generations have been piling 
up to maintain the generosity of the system.  What is the magnitude of this intergenerational 
wealth distribution in the last forty years? The answer to this question is important because it 
will reveal the cost of this generational injustice in terms of distorted economic dynamics in 
Turkey.   
One way to evaluate the generational fairness of a PAYG system is to look at lifetime 
expected wealth increments and losses created by the system for different age cohorts at any 
given time. From a household‘s perspective, SSW can be anticipated on the rest-of-the-life basis.  
In other words, already paid contributions and benefits can be considered as ―sunk‖ and what 
Social Security offers is evaluated based on the future benefits and taxes at any given time.  If 
this anticipation is valid, as a person ages, his/her SSW increases.40 In this sense, aggregated 
series reflect the total value of SSW for all age groups in any given year and truncate the early 
years.  Since contributions paid in the past are excluded from the calculation, as the share of 
beneficiaries (retirees) in the total population covered by Social Security expands, the total value 
of SSW gets bigger.  As seen in Table 7 above, the number of retirees is exponentially increasing 
and surpassing the number of contributors.  Beneficiaries do not have tax liabilities but benefit 
expectations.  In the absence of a required minimum retirement age, the rapid growth in the 
number of beneficiaries explodes the aggregate SSW.  As a result, both the cumulative deficit of 
the Turkish PAYG system based on actuarial projections (Table 8 - below) and the per capita 
expected SSW (Figure 5 - above) are increasing together after 1995.  If the increase in the 
average expected SSW is a result of the increase in the number of retirees and the system is only 
able to honor these promises in the future by increasing unpaid liabilities for unborn generations, 
new entrants of the Turkish social security system should have decreasing SSW expectations.  
This is the question that we will investigate in the rest of the paper.  
The magnitude of a PAYG system‘s generational imbalance can be measured by the net 
present value of future revenues and payments of the system for all current and coming 
                                                 
38
 Even though Turkey has a relatively younger population, the ratio of the population of 65 years old and over to 
ages 0-64 is expected to increase from 5% to 14% in 35 years. The same ratio will be reached by 2020 in the US 
after 75 years. 
39
 Labor force participation rate in Turkey is less than 50%. 
40
 This partly explains the mystery of why people with modest or even negative lifetime SSW values could still 
support Social Security. 
 24 
generations.  The total deficit of Turkish social security system financed by public borrowing 
(and seigniorage) is almost 4.5% of GDP in 2004. Between 1990 and 2003, the present value of 
the total resources used to finance the deficit of the social security system is almost equal to the 
total GNP created in 2003.41 The system‘s generosity and unsustainable financial structure can 
be seen in Table (8) below, which uses the parameters of the system in 1996.  
 
Table 8: Main Results of Actuarial Projections 
 Reverse   Cumulative 
 Dependency Replacement Deficit Deficit 
 Ratio Rate % of GDP % of GDP 
1995 55% 95% 1.80 1.80 
2000 65% 96% 2.70 19.70 
2005 71% 97% 3.40 32.10 
2010 80% 99% 4.30 50.20 
2020 90% 100% 5.60 97.30 
2030 96% 100% 7.00 153.90 
2050 115% 101% 10.10 316.00 
Sources: ILO, IMF, OECD, the World Bank, and the Ministry of Labor Affairs. 
 
The projected deficit for the system in 2005 underestimated the actual by almost 1% of GDP 
and that projected for 2010 was realized by 2004.42  Even though it is clear from the above table 
that the PAYG system in Turkey has been and will be redistributive from younger to older 
generations, the magnitude and the time path of this redistribution for different age cohorts have 
to be analyzed.43 
Unlike aggregate SSW series, in which only future taxes are taken into the calculation 
and past taxes could be considered as ‗sunk‘, individual expected SSW series for different age 
cohorts are calculated at any time as a difference between the present values of incurred and 
expected lifetime contributions and benefits.  Because the information on historical wage series 
based on age, cohort, and gender is not easily available or estimating them entails many 
sensitive assumptions, some researchers use hypothetical simulations for measuring the 
generational fairness of Social Security.44  In these studies, arbitrary income levels for different 
genders are chosen for a typical individual (say at the age of 20 or 25) in any given year and 
deflated for older age cohorts and inflated for coming generations as to reflect the wage 
differences between age cohorts. A similar study done by Brook and Whitehouse (2006) is the 
only attempt to show the distributional characteristics of the Turkish PAYG system. Their 
simulation is based on the eligibility of a generic worker to specific annuitization rules and 
minimum age requirements of the system for different age cohorts.  In their study, the system‘s 
generational generosity is measured by gross pension wealth (PW) and benefit/cost ratios (BCR) 
                                                 
41
 ―Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System‖ (2004), Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
42
 The longevity, which is 69 years in 2005, is expected to be 79 years in 2045 in Turkey. 
43
 In reading the above table, not only demographic projections but also other inefficiencies in the system should be 
taken into considerations.  As underlined in Section 3, the weak link between contributions and benefits (for 
example, in SSK, pensions were linked to wages paid in the last five years and the same link was even worse in ES 
and Bag-Kur: only the last year‘s wages were used to calculate pensions), the high informal employment due to 
relatively high statutory contribution rates, the lack of automatic indexation of the contribution ceiling under high 
inflation conditions, and the low premium collection rates because of administrative inefficiencies are also the major 
reasons behind the soaring deficit. 
44
 Some important studies are cited in Section 2. 
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for an average earner of SSK (Social Security Institution for wage earners) in different age 
cohorts.  In the absence of reliable information on historical wage differences among age 
cohorts and genders, they use an arbitrary income level to calculate past and present 
contributions for each age cohort.  To our knowledge, they use the same income level for each 
age cohort and therefore their calculations do not reflect cohort specific differences in income.  
Because it expands the contribution period and reduces the duration of benefits receipt, the most 
important factor that affects PW and BCR in their calculation is the minimum retirement age.45 
Generally speaking, though, PW and BCR decline significantly only for the age cohorts born 
after 1980, since the fundamental parametric reforms raise the minimum age gradually and went 
into effect after 2001. 
 We do not intent to make an actuarial projection similar to those done by ILO (1995), 
OECD (2005), and IMF (2000) for the Turkish PAYG system.  The information in Table 8 above 
that we compiled from different resources is enough to show the severity of intergenerational 
redistributions caused by the generosity of the system.46  We are rather interested in finding the 
variation in the expected SSW among new entrants in different years.  These expectations could 
change as a new member of the system matures.   However, as long as the assumptions are 
consistent for each age cohort, we believe that the trend or the variation in SSW expectations for 
different age cohorts should give a rough idea about the distributive feature of the system.  There 
are three important points that differentiate our study from actuarial simulations: 
 
1.  Our cohort-specific SSW and implicit rate of return (IRR) values represent 
perceptions that each new entrant in each age cohort may have from Social Security 
and not the actuarial realization that a new entrant may end up with at the end of 
his/her life.  Therefore, the SSW that a representative individual in each age cohort 
might expect would be different than what actually he/she will be entitled at the end. 
2.  Values based on actuarial realization, such as PW and BCR, vary only by the 
―eligibility‖ of each individual to the specifics of the program.  However, since there 
are no effective minimum age requirements before 2000 in Turkey, each hypothetical 
individual in PW and BCR calculations has the same retirement age assumption, 
which had remained the same until 2000.47   Therefore, actuarial realizations of PW 
and BCR before 2000 cannot reveal any information about the difference in 
perceptions of the SSW ‗deal‘ for different age cohorts. 
3.   In Turkey, between 2000 and 2006 there are three different reforms that changed the 
minimum age requirements and other fundamental parameters of the system.  
Besides, all reforms have been amended by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is more 
likely that people‘s expectations on SSW may significantly deviate from what they 
will ultimately be entitled after 2000.    
 
 In finding anticipated SSW and the implicit rate of return for a representative new 
member of the system for different years and genders, we look at a typical worker entering the 
                                                 
45
 They use OECD pension models as described in a study published by OECD (2005).  BCR is the ratio between 
the pension wealth at retirement and the sum of contributions paid into the system (both expressed in present value 
terms)  
46
 However, the rapid growth of the system‘s deficit is resulted from not only the system‘s unsound actuarial 
structure but also its deep administrative inefficiencies, unofficial workforce and so on.  
47
A comparison of the trends in SSW across age cohorts by two methods gives a similar result: it is declining.    
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labor force at the age of 17 and expecting to retire at the age of 55.  Unlike the Brook and 
Whitehouse‘s study (2006), we assume an average constant minimum retirement age that each 
new member would anticipate. Further, we do not use the systems‘ frequently changing 
specifications for annuitizations.  In this sense, our simulations are not directly sensitive to 
parametric changes in the system and represent aggregate expectations of new members on 
social security wealth and not actuarial values that different age cohorts are entitled. The 
assumptions and the simulation methods are the same as previously explained in Section 4 and 
the results are given in Table 9 below.  
 
Table 9: Expected Implicit Rate of Return (IRR) for New Members (TL in 1987 Prices) 
Males      
Birth Year at 17 P.V of Benefits P.V. of Taxes SSW IRR 
1953 1970       3,606,650,457          1,825,975,329        1,780,675,128  98% 
1958 1975       5,265,707,462          3,647,549,968        1,618,157,494  44% 
1963 1980       3,048,514,093          2,583,551,520           464,962,573  18% 
1968 1985       2,577,861,720          2,917,518,656          (339,656,936) -12% 
1973 1990       3,555,285,563          5,138,872,792       (1,583,587,230) -31% 
1978 1995       2,735,679,632          4,022,124,466       (1,286,444,833) -32% 
1983 2000       4,695,027,081          8,018,815,049       (3,323,787,968) -41% 
1984 2001       4,432,429,430          7,987,741,556       (3,555,312,126) -45% 
1985 2002       4,952,771,478          8,437,523,249       (3,484,751,772) -41% 
1986 2003       5,660,229,224        10,042,925,509       (4,382,696,285) -44% 
Females      
Birth Year at 17 P.V of Benefits P.V. of Taxes SSW IRR 
1953 1970          995,219,372             455,949,939           539,269,433  118% 
1958 1975       1,244,271,207             769,338,968           474,932,239  62% 
1963 1980          758,720,899             578,245,901           180,474,998  31% 
1968 1985          639,094,167             650,459,820            (11,365,653) -2% 
1973 1990       1,091,448,917          1,435,145,981          (343,697,063) -24% 
1978 1995          877,644,529          1,204,728,587          (327,084,058) -27% 
1983 2000       2,849,924,052          3,892,975,717       (1,043,051,665) -27% 
1984 2001       2,599,405,050          3,679,470,756       (1,080,065,706) -29% 
1985 2002       2,775,039,747          3,760,828,690          (985,788,943) -26% 
1986 2003       3,415,052,228          4,798,555,499       (1,383,503,271) -29% 
 
As stressed before, in our analysis, the magnitude of the anticipated ‗deal‘ from Social 
Security is not important for specific cohorts and could be modified by increasing the starting 
age to work from 17 to, say, 21.  Before the reform in 1999, if one of the following two 
minimum retirement conditions is satisfied, an individual would be entitled to retire: (1) 25 years 
in the system and 15 years minimum contributions, or (2) age 55 and minimum 15 years 
contributions.  For that reason, if an individual becomes a member of Social Security at the age 
of 17 and pays at least 15 years in the system, he could retire at the age of 43.  If we take this 
case as an example, paying only 15 years and receiving benefits after 43, the IRR and SSW 
would be positive and substantial for that individual before 1999.  The pension model by OECD 
(2005) that compares generosity of the systems across the member countries uses ―minimum 
requirement‖ rules for retirement eligibilities and calculates PW and BCR for an hypothetical 
individual.  Therefore, according to both studies, OECD (2005) and Brook and Whitehouse 
(2006), the Turkish social security is the champion of generosity among the OECD countries, 
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with very high PW and BCR.   
In our simulations, we assume that people with the available information take the current 
factors (benefit and tax) as their expectations. The values of SSW and IRR are directly linked to 
these factors.  However, when we use moving averages of tax and benefit factors, the trend in 
IRR becomes very similar to one in Figures 6 below. 
  
 Figure 6: Trend in Expected IRR for New Members (Males) 
 
 
The trend in IRR for both genders48 shows that new members of the system in every 
following age cohort anticipate a lower return for their social security contributions.  Even 
though our simulation indicates a short period of rise in expectations between 1990 and 1996, 
this escalation is mainly caused by populist policies during a politically unstable period.  There 
are three parametric reforms and several amendments after 2000 that increase the required 
minimum retirement age for new participants and adjusts the annuitization.  In addition to the 
fact that all these changes have occurred in as short a period as four years, many initial 
amendments have been canceled by the Supreme Court and replaced by new ones.  
Consequently, it is hard to speculate about how people formed their expectations in this 
―confusing‖ period about Social Security. Although we incorporate the changes in age 
requirements into our simulations by increasing the retirement age from 55 to 58 and later to 60 
for new members, we do not adjust the way that benefits are calculated in our simulations.49  Our 
results show that the decreasing trend in SSW expectations for new generations is consistent with 
the fact that the Turkish PAYG system is only able to honor generous promises to current 
generation by increasing unpaid liabilities for coming generations. It is safe to say that the 
current system creates a severe generational injustice in the eyes of Turkish people.  
 
                                                 
48
 The IRR values are significantly better for females.  The fundamental reason for this difference is that females 
have significantly higher survival rates. 
49
 The new calculation method for annuities is rather complex.  Since the change was in effect after 2001, we only 
changed the minimum retirement age for new members and kept our fundamental functions the same to calculate 
first annuities based on benefit factor expectations.  This negligence has a very little effect on the aggregate SSW 
series since the change covers only three years after 2001 and the share of new members in the total covered 
individuals is less than 5%.      
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983
Birth Years
IR
R
 28 
6. Conclusion 
Turkey has been undergoing the most substantial recovery in its history after two 
subsequent economic crises in 1999 and 2001.  The reforms led by IMF and the World Bank aim 
at structural changes in the country‘s traditional populist fiscal policies.  The essential part of 
these reforms is Social Security and Health Care.  Turkey is the most generous country in terms 
of social security provisions in the OECD region and there is no actuarial basis in many public 
pension practices.  There are numerous studies in Turkey that investigate this problem and 
possible solutions.  While some researchers have been suggesting structural reforms, the majority 
of proposed solutions are based on parametric adjustments in the system, perhaps because of 
their political feasibility.  However, there is no single study to measure the aggregate magnitude 
of wealth in financial terms generated by the Turkish Social Security relative to other non-
pension wealth in the economy for any given year.  Studies that quantify the value of Social 
Security that a typical individual across generations may anticipate to gain or lose in different 
years are limited.  Has this expected ―deal‖ from Social Security been declining or increasing 
from a representative household‘s perspective in different age cohorts and genders in Turkey?  
This is an important question not only because expectations in Social Security directly affect 
economic dynamics, but also the pay-as-you-go nature of the systems constitutes cumulating 
generational inequality and a Ponzi scheme, which is not sustainable.  There are many 
researchers around the world calculating aggregate and generational values created by Social 
Security, mostly for developed countries. 
 This study is the first of its kind for an emerging country, Turkey.  By putting many 
assumptions, parameters, demographics, survival rates, and complex rules together in a computer 
simulation, we create the aggregate social security wealth series for the period between 1970 and 
2003.  These series show that the expected SSW is the biggest part of household wealth and 
therefore should not be ignored by economists investigating a range of issues such as 
consumption and saving in Turkey50.  Because they are supposed to indicate the magnitude of the 
current aggregate wealth for the entire economy, we use the rest-of-the-life method and consider 
the past contributions and benefits as ―sunk‖ in aggregate SSW simulations.  While this method 
seems valid in calculating aggregate series, we use SSW simulations that cover the entire 
lifetime for finding the ―deal‖ and the anticipated implicit rate of return of a new participant to 
the system in different age cohorts.  How an individual would perceive this ―deal‖ at any period 
of his/her life is an open question.  Calculations covering the entire lifetime require very complex 
techniques and periodic updates through time for an individual.  However, if we compare the 
new participants‘ initial expectations, then the resulting trend for coming generations should be 
indicative of the generational fairness of the system.  Our study shows that, the implicit expected 
rate of return for different age-cohorts has a significant and declining trend in Turkey between 
1970 and 2003. 
These results suggest that the magnitude of the aggregate social security wealth and the 
massive distributional impact of Social Security on wealth are important factors for 
investigations and future reforms seeking for solutions to the Turkish Social Security system. 
                                                 
50
 Aggregate SSW series are used to investigate the saving effects of social security in time-series and cross-section 
studies by Aydede (2006, 2006a). 
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Appendix 1.  Approximation of Housing Wealth in Turkey 
  
        
   #of    Total Housing 
 # of Total value Dwelling Per Dwelling Stock of Total Housing Constant YTL 
 Buildings YTL Units Value YTL Dwellings (Current YTL) 1987=100 
1970       35,299                      2,381          71,589                    0.03           8,097,432                       269,280           44,230,162     
1971       35,458                      2,676          72,816                    0.04           8,170,248                       300,298           41,966,531     
1972       43,822                      3,464          88,231                    0.04           8,258,479                       324,235           40,724,831     
1973       43,192                      4,506          96,163                    0.05           8,354,642                       391,469           40,365,458     
1974       39,072                      5,906          84,199                    0.07           8,438,841                       591,963           47,530,223     
1975       44,122                      9,544          97,431                    0.10           8,536,272                       836,213           55,507,201     
1976       45,141                    10,536        102,110                    0.10           8,638,382                       891,291           51,410,212     
1977       53,937                    15,176        119,409                    0.13           8,757,791                    1,113,043           51,885,198     
1978       52,273                    35,405        120,615                    0.29           8,878,406                    2,606,165           82,830,576     
1979       53,284                    64,489        124,297                    0.52           9,002,703                    4,670,845           84,480,189     
1980       58,970                  116,739        139,207                    0.84           9,141,910                    7,666,419           73,717,907     
1981       53,257                  131,770        118,778                    1.11           9,260,688                  10,273,625           68,575,548     
1982       50,261                  161,315        115,986                    1.39           9,376,674                  13,041,200           67,887,029     
1983       50,719                  228,738        113,453                    2.02           9,490,127                  19,133,477           78,886,397     
1984       54,187                  362,184        122,580                    2.95           9,612,707                  28,402,396           78,996,221     
1985       49,380                  544,192        118,205                    4.60           9,730,912                  44,799,152           81,409,828     
1986       67,528               1,234,924        168,597                    7.32           9,899,509                  72,511,037           96,883,443     
1987       76,106               1,919,741        191,109                  10.05         10,090,618                101,362,966         101,362,966     
1988       78,787               4,038,420        205,485                  19.65         10,296,103                202,350,491         119,486,420     
1989       88,795               7,530,262        250,480                  30.06         10,546,583                317,065,379         106,697,713     
1990       89,217             11,165,964        232,018                  48.13         10,778,601                518,724,747         110,313,008     
1991       87,506             21,557,156        227,570                  94.73         11,006,171             1,042,588,009         139,569,473     
1992     100,090             45,639,626        268,886                169.74         11,275,057             1,913,782,798         156,482,649     
1993       96,694             77,874,115        269,694                288.75         11,544,751             3,333,545,781         162,467,195     
1994       95,469           140,341,023        245,610                571.40         11,790,361             6,736,986,997         159,038,163     
1995       91,548           255,289,420        248,946             1,025.48         12,039,307           12,346,082,266         155,687,653     
1996       99,257           501,132,881        267,306             1,874.75         12,306,613           23,071,867,499         163,595,922     
1997     100,446        1,030,175,494        277,056             3,718.29         12,583,669           46,789,774,667         182,757,994     
1998       86,770        1,605,674,843        238,958             6,719.49         12,822,627           86,161,460,131         191,565,907     
1999       82,849        2,204,068,446        215,613           10,222.34         13,038,240         133,281,268,717         190,492,432     
2000       86,279        3,662,766,998        245,155           14,940.62         13,283,395         198,462,124,714         189,230,514     
2001       81,568        5,738,525,760        243,464           23,570.33         13,526,859         318,832,480,159         196,372,214     
2002       56,029        5,159,938,602        161,491           31,951.86         13,688,350         437,368,320,676         186,895,082     
2003       51,834        6,540,051,331        162,906           40,146.17         13,851,256         556,074,838,629         195,917,791     
 
 
The numbers for buildings and dwelling units are based on occupancy permits, which are taken 
from the State Institutes of Statistics (SIS) together with their values. In order to find the total 
stock of dwelling units for each year, the total population is divided by 4.362 to find the total 
number of households in 1970 and the number of new dwelling units is added to this number 
(8,097,432) for the subsequent years.  The number ‗4.362‘ is chosen to find the same number of 
households in 1985, which is found by SIS 9,730,018.  The other checkpoint for this 
approximation is in 1990, which is 11,188,636 and not consistent with what we found. 
 The main reason for this discrepancy is that the number of total occupancy permits is not 
a correct measure to find each year‘s added dwelling units due to the existence of illegal 
occupations and high rural population in which there is no need for this permit. Therefore the 
total number of dwelling units underestimates the correct number each year.  However, since the 
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price of newly added dwelling units is taken as the average price of all dwelling units, the total 
value of dwelling units probably overestimates the true value of housing wealth.  Even though 
these two factors may offset each other, it is difficult to speculate on the correct measure of 
housing wealth in Turkey. 
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Appendix 2: Data Sources 
 
Benefit and Tax Factors 
 
SSK 
The number of beneficiaries, the amount of benefits (Old-age, Disability and Death - ODD) are 
from special tables sent by SSK. The number of contributors and incurred contributions are from 
SIS.  Average ages and other related other information are from SSK‘s Web page. 
 
ES 
The number of beneficiaries, contributors and the amount of benefits (Old-age, Disability and 
Death - ODD) contributions are from ―Statistical Indicator 1923-2002‖ SIS. Average ages and 
related other information are from ES‘s Web page. 
 
 
Bag-Kur 
The number of beneficiaries, contributors and the amount of benefits (Old-age, Disability and 
Death - ODD) contributions are from ―Statistical Indicator 1923-2002‖ SIS and also sent by BK. 
Average ages and other related information are from BK‘s Web page. 
 
Reference Income 
 
As explained in the paper, we used Net Private Disposable income (NPrvDI), which is 
constructed by the following identity: 
 
NPrvDI = C + I – GS + FS - CoC 
 
The data on household consumption (C), investment (I) and Consumption of Capital (CoC) are 
from the OECD. 
 
Government saving (GS) is calculated by the State Planning Organization (SPO) since 1975 
under the title of ―Public Sector General Balance‖.  For the years between 1970 and 1974, GS is 
estimated by taking 50% of the total government spending in corresponding years.  This is 
because the same ratio is approximately 50% for the years between 1975 and 1985. 
 
Foreign Saving (or resources) is taken from the table, ―General Macro Balance of the Economy‖, 
generated by SPO for the period between 1987 and 2003.  For earlier years Net Export (NX) plus 
Net Foreign Income from Abroad (NFI) is calculated by using the WDI database.   
 
Gross private disposable income is calculated by SPO since 1987 using the same method.  We 
checked whether or not there is an inconsistency between my and SPO‘s numbers and found 
some differences between the two series.  Since we use national accounts by expenditure, these 
differences mainly come from the statistical error (discrepancy) between two different national 
account methods: by production and by expenditure. 
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Labor Force Demographics 
 
The total population, age and gender based labor force, employment numbers and marriage ratios 
are taken from the database created by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) for the years between 
1987 and 2003. For the years before 1988, we used Bulutay (1995) and ILO statistics. 
 
Survival Probabilities 
 
In order to find survival probabilities, we used ADST 49-51 as the mortality table from the US.  
This table is extensively used by private pension companies and we took it from Aviva Life 
Insurance in Turkey. 
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Table 8:  Covered Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Collected statistics from SSK, Emekli Sandigi, Bag-Kur 
        
   ACTIVE INSURED   COVERED EMPLOYMENT 
 Employment Male % Total Male Female  Male Female Total 
1970 13,033,977 63% 2,172,330 1,794,824 377,506  22% 8% 17% 
1971 13,264,658 63% 2,319,417 1,925,861 393,556  23% 8% 17% 
1972 13,643,808 63% 2,694,212 2,256,835 437,377  26% 9% 20% 
1973 13,908,917 63% 3,444,371 2,970,794 473,577  34% 9% 25% 
1974 14,206,803 63% 3,698,895 3,185,150 513,745  36% 10% 26% 
1975 14,386,813 65% 3,779,893 3,258,062 521,831  35% 10% 26% 
1976 14,593,921 65% 4,066,968 3,495,935 571,033  37% 11% 28% 
1977 15,070,207 65% 4,333,854 3,735,129 598,725  38% 11% 29% 
1978 15,276,030 65% 4,415,401 3,817,970 597,431  38% 11% 29% 
1979 15,505,451 65% 4,522,423 3,879,174 643,249  38% 12% 29% 
1980 15,702,127 65% 4,708,044 4,018,778 689,266  39% 12% 30% 
1981 15,839,014 65% 4,873,339 4,131,249 742,090  40% 13% 31% 
1982 16,005,942 65% 4,935,697 4,194,060 741,637  40% 13% 31% 
1983 16,169,270 65% 5,161,151 4,398,315 762,836  42% 13% 32% 
1984 16,419,342 65% 5,485,719 4,678,328 807,391  44% 14% 33% 
1985 16,699,204 65% 5,890,253 5,048,532 841,721  46% 15% 35% 
1986 17,009,503 65% 6,472,816 5,239,652 1,233,164  47% 21% 38% 
1987 17,401,735 65% 6,895,530 5,937,750 957,780  52% 16% 40% 
1988 17,754,000 71% 7,322,060 6,293,562 1,028,498  50% 20% 41% 
1989 18,222,000 69% 7,692,484 6,593,530 1,098,954  53% 19% 42% 
1990 18,539,000 70% 7,990,454 6,825,393 1,165,061  53% 21% 43% 
1991 19,289,000 69% 8,201,767 7,030,647 1,171,120  52% 20% 43% 
1992 19,459,000 70% 8,727,634 7,440,548 1,287,086  54% 22% 45% 
1993 18,501,000 74% 8,993,561 7,678,481 1,315,080  56% 28% 49% 
1994 20,006,000 71% 9,083,046 7,720,429 1,362,617  54% 23% 45% 
1995 20,585,000 71% 9,284,849 7,961,193 1,323,656  54% 22% 45% 
1996 21,194,000 71% 9,554,743 8,086,778 1,467,965  54% 24% 45% 
1997 21,201,000 73% 10,187,024 8,632,350 1,554,674  56% 27% 48% 
1998 21,778,000 72% 10,845,817 9,190,931 1,654,886  59% 27% 50% 
1999 22,048,000 71% 10,460,794 8,363,568 2,097,226  53% 33% 47% 
2000 21,581,000 73% 10,994,287 8,812,562 2,181,725  56% 38% 51% 
2001 21,525,000 72% 10,674,982 8,542,334 2,132,648  55% 36% 50% 
2002 21,351,000 71% 11,137,196 8,911,761 2,225,435  59% 36% 52% 
2003 21,148,000 72% 11,663,428 9,267,583 2,395,845  61% 41% 55% 
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Table 9: Benefit Factors
51
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Social Security Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu -- SSK) for wage earners, Bag-Kur (BK) for self-employed 
people, and the Pension Fund (Emekli Sandigi -- ES) for civil servants.  AE denotes, the second perception methods 
with the weights of 50% for the first year and 25% for the last two years each.  
             
 SSK   ES   BK   Total   AE   
 M F  T  M F  T  M F  T  M F  T  M F  T  
1970  2.36    1.65    2.25      3.09      2.16    2.83        -          -          -        2.81    1.97    2.61    2.81    1.97      2.61  
1971  1.56    1.09    1.49      4.31      3.02    3.94        -          -          -        3.05    2.14    2.85    3.05    2.14      2.85  
1972  1.46    1.02    1.40      4.29      3.00    3.92        -          -          -        3.06    2.14    2.85    3.00    2.10      2.79  
1973  1.42    1.00    1.36      4.01      2.81    3.67    1.81    1.27    1.75      2.83    1.98    2.64    2.94    2.06      2.74  
1974  1.23    0.86    1.17      2.65      1.86    2.42    3.69    2.58    3.55      2.03    1.42    1.89    2.49    1.74      2.32  
1975  1.69    1.18    1.61      2.75      1.92    2.51    0.97    0.68    0.93      2.27    1.59    2.12    2.35    1.65      2.19  
1976  1.38    0.97    1.32      2.77      1.94    2.53    2.38    1.67    2.29      2.10    1.47    1.96    2.13    1.49      1.98  
1977  1.37    0.96    1.30      2.62      1.83    2.39    0.06    0.04    0.06      1.92    1.35    1.80    2.06    1.44      1.92  
1978  1.37    0.96    1.31      2.14      1.50    1.96    0.74    0.52    0.71      1.70    1.19    1.59    1.86    1.30      1.74  
1979  1.04    0.73    0.99      1.69      1.18    1.54    0.61    0.43    0.59      1.28    0.90    1.21    1.55    1.08      1.45  
1980  0.91    0.64    0.88      1.32      0.92    1.21    0.44    0.31    0.42      1.02    0.71    0.96    1.26    0.88      1.18  
1981  0.94    0.66    0.90      1.26      0.88    1.15    0.50    0.35    0.48      1.00    0.70    0.94    1.08    0.75      1.01  
1982  0.97    0.68    0.93      1.31      0.92    1.20    0.47    0.33    0.45      1.03    0.72    0.97    1.02    0.71      0.96  
1983  0.94    0.66    0.90      1.27      0.89    1.16    0.62    0.44    0.60      1.01    0.70    0.95    1.01    0.71      0.96  
1984  0.80    0.56    0.77      0.99      0.69    0.90    0.53    0.37    0.51      0.83    0.58    0.78    0.92    0.65      0.87  
1985  0.70    0.49    0.67      0.97      0.68    0.88    0.52    0.36    0.50      0.76    0.53    0.72    0.84    0.59      0.79  
1986  0.59    0.41    0.56      0.90      0.63    0.82    0.46    0.33    0.45      0.66    0.46    0.63    0.73    0.51      0.69  
1987  0.49    0.34    0.47      0.73      0.51    0.66    0.27    0.19    0.26      0.52    0.37    0.50    0.62    0.43      0.58  
1988  0.65    0.45    0.62      0.69      0.48    0.63    0.32    0.23    0.31      0.60    0.42    0.57    0.60    0.42      0.56  
1989  0.57    0.40    0.54      1.17      0.82    1.07    0.33    0.23    0.32      0.68    0.48    0.65    0.62    0.44      0.59  
1990  0.52    0.36    0.50      1.33      0.93    1.22    0.34    0.24    0.33      0.70    0.49    0.66    0.67    0.47      0.64  
1991  0.56    0.40    0.54      1.29      0.90    1.18    0.30    0.21    0.29      0.69    0.49    0.66    0.69    0.49      0.66  
1992  0.55    0.39    0.53      1.27      0.89    1.16    0.39    0.27    0.37      0.70    0.49    0.67    0.70    0.49      0.66  
1993  0.49    0.34    0.47      1.11      0.78    1.02    0.37    0.26    0.35      0.62    0.43    0.59    0.66    0.46      0.63  
1994  0.37    0.26    0.35      0.87      0.61    0.80    0.33    0.23    0.32      0.49    0.34    0.46    0.57    0.40      0.54  
1995  0.29    0.20    0.27      1.10      0.77    1.00    0.29    0.20    0.28      0.46    0.32    0.44    0.51    0.35      0.48  
1996  0.60    0.42    0.57      1.41      0.98    1.28    0.39    0.27    0.38      0.73    0.51    0.69    0.60    0.42      0.57  
1997  0.78    0.54    0.74      1.47      1.03    1.35    0.41    0.28    0.39      0.85    0.60    0.81    0.72    0.51      0.69  
1998  0.80    0.56    0.76      1.43      1.00    1.31    0.63    0.44    0.61      0.90    0.63    0.85    0.85    0.59      0.80  
1999  0.87    0.61    0.82      1.61      1.13    1.48    0.76    0.53    0.74      1.00    0.70    0.95    0.94    0.66      0.89  
2000  0.78    0.55    0.74      1.46      1.02    1.33    0.71    0.50    0.69      0.91    0.64    0.86    0.93    0.65      0.88  
2001  0.80    0.56    0.76      1.48      1.04    1.35    0.68    0.48    0.66      0.92    0.64    0.87    0.94    0.66      0.89  
2002  0.86    0.60    0.82      1.59      1.11    1.45    0.80    0.56    0.77      1.00    0.70    0.94    0.96    0.67      0.90  
2003  0.87    0.61    0.82      1.61      1.12    1.47    1.01    0.70    0.97      1.04    0.73    0.99    1.00    0.70      0.95  
Count      34       34       34         34         34       34       31       31       31         34       34       34    1970-2003 
Mean   0.93    0.65    0.89      1.76      1.23    1.61    0.71    0.50    0.69      1.24    0.87    1.17     
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Table 10: Tax Factors
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 SSK   ES   BK   Total   AE   
 M F T M F T M F T M F T M F T 
1970  0.30    0.21    0.30      0.51      0.36    0.46        -          -          -        0.38    0.27    0.36    0.38    0.27      0.36  
1971  0.26    0.19    0.26      0.92      0.65    0.84        -          -          -        0.51    0.36    0.48    0.51    0.36      0.48  
1972  0.25    0.17    0.24      0.81      0.56    0.73    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.42    0.29    0.40    0.43    0.30      0.41  
1973  0.28    0.20    0.27      0.71      0.50    0.65    0.11    0.08    0.11      0.36    0.25    0.34    0.41    0.29      0.39  
1974  0.27    0.19    0.26      0.73      0.51    0.66    0.08    0.06    0.08      0.35    0.25    0.34    0.37    0.26      0.35  
1975  0.33    0.23    0.32      0.86      0.60    0.78    0.07    0.05    0.07      0.42    0.29    0.40    0.39    0.27      0.37  
1976  0.35    0.25    0.34      0.65      0.46    0.59    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.37    0.26    0.35    0.38    0.26      0.36  
1977  0.36    0.25    0.35      0.64      0.45    0.58    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.37    0.26    0.35    0.38    0.27      0.36  
1978  0.36    0.25    0.35      0.56      0.39    0.51    0.04    0.03    0.04      0.34    0.24    0.33    0.35    0.25      0.34  
1979  0.29    0.21    0.29      0.52      0.36    0.47    0.05    0.03    0.05      0.29    0.21    0.28    0.32    0.23      0.31  
1980  0.22    0.16    0.22      0.40      0.28    0.36    0.07    0.05    0.07      0.23    0.16    0.22    0.28    0.19      0.26  
1981  0.29    0.21    0.29      0.38      0.27    0.35    0.08    0.06    0.08      0.27    0.19    0.25    0.27    0.19      0.25  
1982  0.30    0.21    0.29      0.42      0.29    0.38    0.09    0.06    0.09      0.28    0.19    0.27    0.26    0.19      0.25  
1983  0.33    0.23    0.32      0.44      0.31    0.40    0.08    0.06    0.08      0.29    0.20    0.28    0.28    0.20      0.27  
1984  0.30    0.21    0.29      0.36      0.25    0.33    0.07    0.05    0.06      0.25    0.17    0.24    0.26    0.19      0.25  
1985  0.27    0.19    0.27      0.36      0.25    0.33    0.07    0.05    0.07      0.23    0.16    0.22    0.25    0.17      0.24  
1986  0.26    0.18    0.25      0.36      0.25    0.33    0.05    0.03    0.04      0.21    0.15    0.20    0.22    0.16      0.21  
1987  0.34    0.24    0.33      0.28      0.20    0.26    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.22    0.15    0.21    0.22    0.15      0.21  
1988  0.30    0.21    0.29      0.31      0.21    0.28    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.21    0.14    0.20    0.21    0.15      0.20  
1989  0.30    0.21    0.29      0.53      0.37    0.48    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.24    0.17    0.23    0.23    0.16      0.22  
1990  0.32    0.22    0.31      0.66      0.46    0.60    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.28    0.19    0.27    0.25    0.18      0.24  
1991  0.35    0.25    0.34      0.69      0.48    0.63    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.30    0.21    0.29    0.28    0.20      0.27  
1992  0.31    0.21    0.30      0.64      0.44    0.58    0.04    0.03    0.04      0.28    0.20    0.27    0.29    0.20      0.27  
1993  0.26    0.18    0.25      0.53      0.37    0.48    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.24    0.17    0.23    0.27    0.19      0.25  
1994  0.19    0.13    0.18      0.49      0.34    0.44    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.20    0.14    0.19    0.23    0.16      0.22  
1995  0.13    0.09    0.12      0.55      0.38    0.49    0.03    0.02    0.03      0.18    0.13    0.17    0.20    0.14      0.19  
1996  0.20    0.14    0.19      0.63      0.44    0.57    0.04    0.03    0.04      0.24    0.17    0.23    0.21    0.15      0.21  
1997  0.23    0.16    0.22      0.69      0.48    0.62    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.27    0.19    0.25    0.24    0.17      0.23  
1998  0.21    0.15    0.20      0.69      0.48    0.62    0.05    0.04    0.05      0.25    0.18    0.24    0.25    0.18      0.24  
1999  0.27    0.19    0.26      0.72      0.51    0.65    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.30    0.21    0.28    0.28    0.20      0.26  
2000  0.33    0.23    0.31      0.67      0.47    0.60    0.07    0.05    0.07      0.31    0.22    0.29    0.29    0.20      0.28  
2001  0.36    0.25    0.34      0.67      0.47    0.60    0.08    0.06    0.08      0.33    0.23    0.31    0.32    0.22      0.30  
2002  0.35    0.25    0.33      0.70      0.49    0.63    0.10    0.07    0.09      0.34    0.24    0.32    0.33    0.23      0.31  
2003  0.38    0.26    0.35      0.74      0.52    0.67    0.11    0.07    0.10      0.37    0.26    0.35    0.35    0.25      0.33  
Count      34       34       34         34         34       34       32       32       32         34       34       34    1970-2003 
Mean   0.29    0.20    0.28      0.58      0.41    0.53    0.06    0.04    0.06      0.30    0.21    0.28     
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 Social Security Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu -- SSK) for wage earners, Bag-Kur (BK) for self-employed 
people, and the Pension Fund (Emekli Sandigi -- ES) for civil servants.  AE denotes, the second perception methods 
with the weights of 50% for the first year and 25% for the last two years each.  
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53
 (with different assumptions) 
 
 d 0.03 d 0.03 d 0.03 d 0.05 d 0.05 
 Factors cr Factors av Factors ae Factors cr Factors ae 
 SSWG SSW SSWG SSW SSWG SSW SSWG SSW SSWG SSW 
1970  1,538,760    1,237,829       750,028       506,317    1,538,760    1,237,829       918,216       684,551       918,216       684,551  
1971  1,853,718    1,414,656       861,335       603,818    1,853,718    1,414,656    1,113,406       772,483    1,113,406       772,483  
1972  2,292,276    1,831,641    1,059,521       740,907    2,249,680    1,787,542    1,374,583    1,016,903    1,350,122       991,277  
1973  2,591,300    2,117,187    1,257,458       864,126    2,685,384    2,142,049    1,545,950    1,177,791    1,599,990    1,178,079  
1974  2,002,789    1,506,492    1,291,673       870,015    2,413,238    1,889,419    1,197,103       811,719    1,432,855    1,026,099  
1975  2,236,259    1,726,031    1,315,737       882,243    2,307,708    1,769,186    1,325,961       930,264    1,366,532       948,893  
1976  2,323,808    1,756,546    1,468,598       986,649    2,348,358    1,749,640    1,383,670       943,742    1,397,610       933,287  
1977  2,366,450    1,748,615    1,627,208    1,102,292    2,508,383    1,856,288    1,421,293       942,145    1,501,888       996,169  
1978  2,071,286    1,467,960    1,582,035    1,069,445    2,234,614    1,597,832    1,249,904       782,007    1,342,648       848,805  
1979  1,662,872    1,038,514    1,615,584    1,085,125    1,952,480    1,293,500    1,014,261       530,053    1,178,707       667,648  
1980  1,438,040       763,872    1,701,377    1,128,599    1,718,052    1,006,500       882,282       360,344    1,041,085       490,203  
1981  1,310,707       702,571    1,565,555    1,048,878    1,390,194       748,335       811,436       340,619       856,514       359,589  
1982  1,424,697       795,018    1,655,857    1,120,877    1,412,824       748,227       887,456       399,960       880,723       366,194  
1983  1,442,825       793,914    1,707,867    1,156,547    1,447,783       762,888       901,323       398,938       904,134       373,891  
1984  1,330,385       473,489    1,849,264    1,236,679    1,450,014       656,712       833,636       170,230       901,480       287,308  
1985  1,246,935       482,981    1,865,051    1,250,103    1,347,129       569,151       782,743       190,448       839,935       236,767  
1986  1,176,051       366,237    1,974,595    1,312,404    1,266,389       424,836       740,275       112,449       791,827       139,396  
1987  1,190,243       221,957    2,463,057    1,618,056    1,358,668       352,216       750,295             (423)      846,435         66,128  
1988  1,414,424       627,432    2,601,326    1,804,874    1,408,903       542,304       907,923       292,942       904,677       227,489  
1989  1,689,484    1,043,496    2,757,543    1,938,640    1,570,689       810,806    1,090,033       585,125    1,019,957       426,028  
1990  1,984,882    1,161,973    3,164,679    2,246,813    1,921,580    1,102,371    1,288,880       644,910    1,251,394       610,318  
1991  2,077,414    1,123,564    3,314,198    2,293,573    2,075,380    1,168,417    1,334,771       590,563    1,333,594       625,968  
1992  2,343,007    1,253,408    3,705,528    2,563,174    2,335,932    1,265,900    1,504,815       654,606    1,500,719       665,805  
1993  2,348,538    1,358,946    4,116,223    2,840,096    2,459,535    1,391,982    1,514,234       741,411    1,578,598       744,892  
1994  1,679,146       878,172    3,588,685    2,448,664    1,898,426    1,041,595    1,087,917       462,376    1,214,937       545,773  
1995  1,671,200       802,779    3,749,300    2,561,427    1,798,141       924,993    1,085,781       406,967    1,159,350       476,841  
1996  2,735,733    1,894,410    4,117,741    2,904,011    2,389,219    1,533,536    1,781,359    1,123,897    1,580,711       912,027  
1997  3,617,608    2,508,821    4,790,526    3,437,133    3,226,278    2,189,994    2,363,515    1,496,451    2,136,814    1,326,447  
1998  4,256,076    2,840,422    5,417,815    3,898,396    4,069,528    2,787,195    2,771,161    1,663,242    2,662,975    1,659,395  
1999  4,410,336    2,993,842    5,131,022    3,722,677    4,219,029    2,894,289    2,923,774    1,814,384    2,811,871    1,774,341  
2000  4,104,165    2,744,668    5,132,662    3,706,956    4,170,868    2,800,545    2,726,582    1,660,532    2,765,649    1,691,111  
2001  3,946,646    2,892,795    4,875,007    3,572,097    4,002,618    2,837,479    2,645,874    1,818,543    2,678,741    1,764,045  
2002  4,270,969    3,394,092    4,966,195    3,678,725    4,146,627    3,140,927    2,861,526    2,172,123    2,788,260    1,997,577  
2003  4,835,109    3,996,765    5,454,142    4,071,128    4,699,809    3,765,488    3,239,580    2,579,284    3,159,574    2,423,685  
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av, average factors, is the first perception method; ae, adaptive expectations, is the second; and cr, current 
is the third. 
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Table 12: SSW Series
54
 (with d = 3%, g-annuities = 0%, g-income = 2%, and the current perception method) 
 
 SSWG   SSTX  SSW  
 Total Population Per Capita Total Per Capita Total Per Capita 
1970    54,350,527,270,554    35,321,000    1,538,760    10,629,176,159,073       300,931      43,721,351,111,480    1,237,829  
1971    67,132,406,937,214    36,215,000    1,853,718    15,900,641,488,810       439,062      51,231,765,448,405    1,414,656  
1972    85,116,800,473,441    37,132,000    2,292,276    17,104,288,708,233       460,635      68,012,511,765,208    1,831,641  
1973    98,658,575,257,819    38,073,000    2,591,300    18,050,920,254,318       474,113      80,607,655,003,501    2,117,187  
1974    78,182,880,531,866    39,037,000    2,002,789    19,373,970,717,172       496,298      58,808,909,814,694    1,506,492  
1975    89,508,490,160,736    40,026,000    2,236,259    20,422,385,303,618       510,228      69,086,104,857,118    1,726,031  
1976    95,080,919,462,028    40,916,000    2,323,808    23,210,069,956,582       567,261      71,870,849,505,446    1,756,546  
1977    98,844,234,412,328    41,769,000    2,366,450    25,806,313,911,044       617,834      73,037,920,501,284    1,748,615  
1978    88,321,712,321,793    42,641,000    2,071,286    25,726,425,427,173       603,326      62,595,286,894,620    1,467,960  
1979    72,386,462,635,603    43,531,000    1,662,872    27,178,923,842,107       624,358      45,207,538,793,496    1,038,514  
1980    63,905,042,797,628    44,439,000    1,438,040    29,959,345,886,069       674,168      33,945,696,911,559       763,872  
1981    59,689,598,027,950    45,540,000    1,310,707    27,694,515,046,711       608,136      31,995,082,981,238       702,571  
1982    66,516,272,484,705    46,688,000    1,424,697    29,398,472,942,086       629,679      37,117,799,542,618       795,018  
1983    69,059,396,404,999    47,864,000    1,442,825    31,059,475,003,612       648,911      37,999,921,401,388       793,914  
1984    65,281,989,964,737    49,070,000    1,330,385    42,047,875,116,275       856,896      23,234,114,848,462       473,489  
1985    62,728,296,464,146    50,306,000    1,246,935    38,431,477,422,291       763,954      24,296,819,041,855       482,981  
1986    60,487,813,194,158    51,433,000    1,176,051    41,651,132,986,452       809,813      18,836,680,207,707       366,237  
1987    62,560,386,589,174    52,561,000    1,190,243    50,894,120,948,884       968,287      11,666,265,640,290       221,957  
1988    75,975,785,553,804    53,715,000    1,414,424    42,273,274,989,123       786,992      33,702,510,564,681       627,432  
1989    92,740,821,064,965    54,893,000    1,689,484    35,460,210,488,040       645,988      57,280,610,576,925    1,043,496  
1990  111,574,201,488,143    56,212,000    1,984,882    46,257,369,560,140       822,909      65,316,831,928,003    1,161,973  
1991  119,017,102,423,785    57,291,000    2,077,414    54,646,997,457,514       953,850      64,370,104,966,271    1,123,564  
1992  136,782,405,621,274    58,379,000    2,343,007    63,609,671,688,489    1,089,599      73,172,733,932,784    1,253,408  
1993  139,686,367,290,309    59,478,000    2,348,538    58,858,997,077,826       989,593      80,827,370,212,484    1,358,946  
1994  101,734,409,977,557    60,587,000    1,679,146    48,528,588,907,082       800,974      53,205,821,070,475       878,172  
1995  103,123,054,456,797    61,706,000    1,671,200    53,586,791,696,367       868,421      49,536,262,760,430       802,779  
1996  171,916,202,923,624    62,841,000    2,735,733    52,869,559,916,538       841,323    119,046,643,007,086    1,894,410  
1997  231,487,099,975,894    63,989,000    3,617,608    70,950,158,326,920    1,108,787    160,536,941,648,974    2,508,821  
1998  277,262,042,246,312    65,145,000    4,256,076    92,222,739,800,584    1,415,653    185,039,302,445,728    2,840,422  
1999  292,422,906,663,681    66,304,000    4,410,336    93,919,219,353,310    1,416,494    198,503,687,310,371    2,993,842  
2000  276,903,910,265,064    67,469,000    4,104,165    91,723,929,618,938    1,359,497    185,179,980,646,126    2,744,668  
2001  270,810,986,790,403    68,618,000    3,946,646    72,313,209,393,816    1,053,852    198,497,777,396,587    2,892,795  
2002  297,929,985,831,085    69,757,000    4,270,969    61,168,290,430,124       876,877    236,761,695,400,961    3,394,092  
2003  342,736,720,673,866    70,885,000    4,835,109    59,426,004,874,410       838,344    283,310,715,799,456    3,996,765  
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 g denotes the growth rate. 
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Table 13: SSWG Series (with d = 3%, g-annuities = 0%, g-income = 2%, and the current perception method) 
 
          
 Workers Workers' Wives Retirees Retirees' Wives Disable Survivors Total Population Per Capita 
1970    42,389,956,317,351      7,468,352,549,081      2,275,950,120,748         418,720,521,526       277,499,538,873      1,520,048,222,976      54,350,527,270,554    35,321,000    1,538,760  
1971    51,526,390,882,588      9,053,473,647,556      3,545,807,357,182         645,152,976,322       383,904,942,583      1,977,677,130,984      67,132,406,937,214    36,215,000    1,853,718  
1972    65,469,345,492,228    11,581,225,355,773      4,757,599,167,616         862,694,605,177       418,978,236,339      2,026,957,616,308      85,116,800,473,441    37,132,000    2,292,276  
1973    76,590,626,375,903    13,854,267,990,017      5,013,237,263,135         911,658,048,865       417,997,742,341      1,870,787,837,559      98,658,575,257,819    38,073,000    2,591,300  
1974    60,431,874,061,241    10,917,867,852,047      4,112,023,949,165         751,069,658,581       362,753,101,439      1,607,291,909,392      78,182,880,531,866    39,037,000    2,002,789  
1975    68,932,927,885,622    12,313,196,647,939      5,189,742,693,017         956,966,521,260       377,001,632,740      1,738,654,780,158      89,508,490,160,736    40,026,000    2,236,259  
1976    72,520,160,694,066    12,927,537,456,476      6,015,631,144,730      1,106,412,896,295       409,982,849,329      2,101,194,421,132      95,080,919,462,028    40,916,000    2,323,808  
1977    73,802,017,614,673    13,181,842,589,272      7,399,215,642,072      1,377,650,208,140       458,857,620,857      2,624,650,737,315      98,844,234,412,328    41,769,000    2,366,450  
1978    65,139,903,002,534    11,663,351,973,005      7,248,496,251,241      1,362,359,924,501       401,308,964,103      2,506,292,206,408      88,321,712,321,793    42,641,000    2,071,286  
1979    51,899,592,751,310      9,236,977,945,462      7,123,477,761,366      1,375,802,632,341       393,565,310,125      2,357,046,234,999      72,386,462,635,603    43,531,000    1,662,872  
1980    45,151,548,555,259      7,811,946,327,589      7,138,897,199,395      1,402,790,960,699       330,671,510,674      2,069,188,244,012      63,905,042,797,628    44,439,000    1,438,040  
1981    41,081,403,161,972      7,070,914,833,734      7,568,982,701,048      1,486,986,736,052       337,604,218,678      2,143,706,376,466      59,689,598,027,950    45,540,000    1,310,707  
1982    44,906,373,865,005      7,743,098,407,090      9,380,528,598,757      1,849,312,016,681       354,871,705,507      2,282,087,891,665      66,516,272,484,705    46,688,000    1,424,697  
1983    46,341,500,296,538      8,007,924,598,042      9,800,762,299,501      1,965,657,882,854       381,768,349,775      2,561,782,978,289      69,059,396,404,999    47,864,000    1,442,825  
1984    43,399,080,489,901      7,503,589,200,909      9,543,027,095,771      1,921,395,849,942       366,733,463,144      2,548,163,865,070      65,281,989,964,737    49,070,000    1,330,385  
1985    41,885,577,283,786      7,431,389,462,295      8,987,825,199,910      1,806,842,114,042       300,798,083,036      2,315,864,321,077      62,728,296,464,146    50,306,000    1,246,935  
1986    40,338,892,978,600      6,849,632,510,230      8,926,179,880,086      1,797,307,603,144       293,111,776,589      2,282,688,445,509      60,487,813,194,158    51,433,000    1,176,051  
1987    41,233,940,146,710      7,341,804,470,313      9,437,970,398,145      1,904,895,835,997       303,869,617,443      2,337,906,120,566      62,560,386,589,174    52,561,000    1,190,243  
1988    50,013,961,759,123      9,421,304,602,506    11,553,340,217,862      2,373,753,984,977       298,067,623,837      2,315,357,365,500      75,975,785,553,804    53,715,000    1,414,424  
1989    60,533,164,662,732    11,519,973,022,523    14,302,510,006,869      2,880,843,305,419       403,831,295,229      3,100,498,772,192      92,740,821,064,965    54,893,000    1,689,484  
1990    71,970,119,328,821    13,724,827,066,198    17,333,636,443,012      3,451,321,625,256       579,278,785,209      4,515,018,239,647    111,574,201,488,143    56,212,000    1,984,882  
1991    75,738,451,206,243    14,076,443,127,228    19,674,935,842,793      3,937,698,751,069       398,282,790,971      5,191,290,705,482    119,017,102,423,785    57,291,000    2,077,414  
1992    87,543,052,642,385    16,138,630,268,076    22,112,405,382,576      4,342,025,164,298       710,330,656,879      5,935,961,507,060    136,782,405,621,274    58,379,000    2,343,007  
1993    88,537,154,517,579    16,429,626,943,954    23,093,143,784,927      4,527,784,920,558       743,564,108,678      6,355,093,014,613    139,686,367,290,309    59,478,000    2,348,538  
1994    63,285,646,852,325    11,751,687,379,160    17,787,845,753,447      3,477,707,129,393       554,618,023,567      4,876,904,839,665    101,734,409,977,557    60,587,000    1,679,146  
1995    63,212,896,329,304    11,927,857,566,197    18,438,980,638,338      3,609,726,264,460       610,647,044,953      5,322,946,613,544    103,123,054,456,797    61,706,000    1,671,200  
1996  104,482,469,889,783    19,481,250,635,100    32,710,744,161,058      6,583,808,503,302       887,292,080,495      7,770,637,653,886    171,916,202,923,624    62,841,000    2,735,733  
1997  139,141,619,899,724    25,874,488,817,022    44,759,722,228,645      9,005,515,568,840    1,178,315,285,472    11,527,438,176,191    231,487,099,975,894    63,989,000    3,617,608  
1998  168,606,859,497,856    31,689,803,860,151    52,821,671,958,977    10,655,409,238,827    1,298,510,656,385    12,189,787,034,117    277,262,042,246,312    65,145,000    4,256,076  
1999  169,345,094,927,582    32,172,811,534,762    62,309,674,491,934    12,506,480,217,513    1,505,796,472,967    14,583,049,018,922    292,422,906,663,681    66,304,000    4,410,336  
2000  159,030,812,113,033    30,820,187,036,107    59,715,998,731,710    11,985,270,291,618    1,393,073,454,415    13,958,568,638,182    276,903,910,265,064    67,469,000    4,104,165  
2001  151,096,290,487,080    29,118,947,112,345    61,820,770,802,245    12,401,244,826,556    1,423,129,880,208    14,950,603,681,969    270,810,986,790,403    68,618,000    3,946,646  
2002  167,925,273,466,549    32,595,030,574,323    66,838,136,162,187    13,485,471,140,956    1,292,771,572,066    15,793,302,915,005    297,929,985,831,085    69,757,000    4,270,969  
2003  194,779,474,899,311    37,977,611,772,383    74,752,535,034,733    15,070,650,390,061    1,385,751,216,613    18,770,697,360,765    342,736,720,673,866    70,885,000    4,835,109  
 
